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Preface
This thesis is composed of the following four articles organized in a book format.
1. ‘Energy subsidy reform for growth and equity in Egypt: The approach matters’ by Clemens
Breisinger, Askar Mukashov, Mariam Raouf, and Manfred Wiebelt. The paper is published in
Energy Policy (2019, Vol. 129, 661-671, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.02.059).
Contributions of the co-authors:
• Clemens Breisinger: general concept and research questions; policy relevance and actuality
in the context of energy subsidy reform; interpretation of simulation results and policy
recommendations;
• Askar Mukashov: implementation of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) simulations;
analysis and interpretation of results; more details are below.
• Mariam Raouf: data collection, including the construction of the Social Accounting Matrix
(SAM); country-specific literature research;
• Manfred Wiebelt: development of specific research questions and construction of the pri-
mary CGE model; interpretation of simulation results.
Detailed overview of my contribution:
• estimation of household income elasticities (using household survey data);
• other parametrization of the CGE model, including specification of trade and production
elasticities, factor growth, population growth, etc.
• data input for various scenarios, including fuel price and food subsidy changes;
• various adjustments of the CGE model, including its closure rules;
• implementing, running, adjusting, and analyzing simulations in GAMS.
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Hereby we affirm that each co-author made an essential contribution to the paper accord-
ing to the DFG- guidelines ‘Securing good scientific conduct’ (DEU: ‘Sicherung guter wis-
senschaftlicher Praxis’).
Clemens Breisinger Askar Mukashov
Mariam Raouf Manfred Wiebelt
vi
2. ‘Modeling conflict impact and post-conflict reconstruction: The case of Yemen’ by Clemens
Breisinger, Wilfried Engelke, Askar Mukashov, and Manfred Wiebelt. The article is published
as a working paper at MENA RP Working Papers (2020, 29) and is submitted for publication
at Economic Systems . The current status of the paper is ‘under review’ after the first round
of revisions. In this dissertation, I present the latest version of the paper.
Contributions of the co-authors:
• Clemens Breisinger: general concept and research questions; policy relevance in the context
of ongoing conflict; interpretation of the simulation results and conclusions;
• Wilfried Engelke: general concept and research questions; country-specific literature re-
search, including analysis of the conflict shocks and damages; construction of the SAM,
jointly with the IFPRI and local partners; discussion and interpretation of the simulation
results; conclusions;
• Askar Mukashov: implementation of CGE simulations; analysis and interpretation of re-
sults; more details are below.
• Manfred Wiebelt: development of specific research questions; construction of the SAM,
jointly with IFPRI and local partners; interpretation of the simulation results.
Detailed overview of my contribution:
• complete specification of the CGE model for both conflict and post-conflict periods;
• complete specification of the post-conflict uncertainty with the use of Systematic Sensi-
tivity Analysis (SSA) method;
• implementing, running, adjusting, and analyzing simulations in GAMS and R;
• results interpretation in the context of country-specific and broad literature.
Hereby we affirm that each co-author made an essential contribution to the paper accord-
ing to the DFG- guidelines ‘Securing good scientific conduct’ (DEU: ‘Sicherung guter wis-
senschaftlicher Praxis’).
Clemens Breisinger Wilfried Engelke
Askar Mukashov Manfred Wiebelt
vii
3. ‘Parameter Uncertainty in Policy Planning Models: Using Portfolio Management Methods
to Choose Optimal Policies under World Market Volatility’ by Askar Mukashov. The article is
published in 2021 as a working paper at Agricultural Policy Working Paper Series (WP2021-
01) and is submitted for publication at Economic Analysis and Policy (current status: under
review).
Hereby I affirm that the paper was written in compliance with the DFG- guidelines ‘Securing
good scientific conduct’ (DEU: ‘Sicherung guter wissenschaftlicher Praxis’).
Askar Mukashov
viii
4. ‘The Role of Global Climate Change in Structural Transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa:
Case Study of Senegal’ by Askar Mukashov, Christian Henning, Richard Robertson, and Man-
fred Wiebelt. The article is published as a working paper at Kiel Working Papers (No. 2187,
June 2021). Individual contributions of the co-authors:
• Askar Mukashov: research questions; modeling framework; simulations of the primary
CGE model; analysis and interpretation of results. More details are below.
• Christian Henning: general concept; design of policy interventions to counteract deagrar-
ianization towards services;
• Richard Robertson: impact of Global Climate Change (GCC) scenarios on agricultural
world market prices and productivities in Senegal; analysis and discussion of simulation
results;
• Manfred Wiebelt: interpretation of the simulation results; policy implications.
Detailed overview of my contribution:
• research questions in the context of GCC in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA);
• complete specification of the Senegal’s CGE model, including adjustments of the core
equations to represent interregional mobility;
• implementing, running, adjusting, and analyzing simulations in GAMS;
• results interpretation in the context of country-specific and broad literature.
Hereby we affirm that each co-author made an essential contribution to the paper accord-
ing to the DFG- guidelines ‘Securing good scientific conduct’ (DEU: ‘Sicherung guter wis-
senschaftlicher Praxis’).
Askar Mukashov Christian Henning
Richard Robertson Manfred Wiebelt
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Introduction
Development policy has shifted from the Washington consensus towards a Pro-Poor Growth
and Sustainable development agenda. One of the most important consequences is the result-
ing/accompanying changing focus away from macroeconomic stabilization to more refined policy
interventions on the sector and household levels (OECD 2007; Grimm et al. 2015). Depending
on the country-specific circumstances, desired outcomes along increasingly complex dimensions
of national goals can have synergies or trade-offs (UNDP 2012). The necessity to allocate public
or donor funds across many potentially competing policies created the demand for the tools to
quantitatively formulate and compare the effects of policy interventions (Henning et al. 2018).
One of the tools used for these purposes in modern policy analysis is Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) modeling. This class of deterministic models has certain advantages over
other policy evaluation tools that made them famous in policy analysis (Robinson 1991; Taylor
1990, 2016; Dixon and Rimmer 2016). Most importantly, the structural nature of CGE models
accounts for sectoral as well as household characteristics and allows reflecting both direct and
indirect effects of policy interventions (Dervis et al. 1982; Löfgren et al. 2002; Diao and Thurlow
2012). Furthermore, unlike the ex-post nature of econometric-based tools, the ex-ante nature
of CGE models allows considering policies that did not have precedents (Pauw and Thurlow
2015). In this context, another practical advantage of the CGE models is their ability to quan-
tify otherwise unidentifiable economy-wide repercussions of various shocks such as disasters,
sanctions, climate change, etc. (e. g., Gharibnavaz and Waschik 2017; Zhou and Chen 2020;
Tan et al. 2019; Wiebelt et al. 2015).
At the same time, the use of CGE modeling methods is not straightforward, and due to
their complexity, sometimes they are even labeled as a ‘black-box’ (e. g., Böhringer et al. 2003).
As with many other modeling instruments, quantitative or even qualitative results and policy
conclusions based on a CGE model, heavily depend on the underlying data and assumptions.
Usually, CGE models are uniquely designed for a specific study and often involve constructing
a corresponding unique database - Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) (see Pyatt and Round
1985; Breisinger et al. 2009). Furthermore, depending on the country’s circumstances and
research questions, a researcher must specify appropriate functional forms, closure rules, and
model parameters (see e. g. Dervis et al. 1982; Annabi et al. 2006). Model misspecification
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at any level can heavily influence simulation results and corrupt policy conclusions (see e. g.,
McKitrick 1998; Fugazza and Maur 2008; Olekseyuk and Schürenberg-Frosch 2016). Therefore,
in most CGE-based studies, significant attention is usually given to the context of a specific
study and corresponding unique model with its underlying data and assumptions.
Following these lines, my dissertation focuses on using modern CGE modeling techniques
and methods to address national development problems in three developing countries: Egypt,
Yemen, and Senegal. Each of these countries faces specific policy prioritization problems, which
my co-authors and I address using corresponding modeling methods.
Egypt
In the case of Egypt, we investigate the economic consequences of its long-awaited energy sub-
sidy reform (chapter 1, ‘Energy Subsidy Reform for Growth and Equity in Egypt: The Approach
Matters’). Phasing off energy subsidies is a core element of Egypt’s structural transformation
program and a key instrument to balance its government budget (IMF 2015). At the same
time, in the context of simultaneous devaluation of the Egyptian Pound and increased prices
of imports, the government is also particularly concerned about the welfare of poor households
(Breisinger et al. 2018). My co-authors and I build an energy-focused CGE model for Egypt and
investigate the short and long-term effects of the reform on the economy and households. We
find that phasing out energy subsidies is likely to hamper Egypt’s short-term economic growth,
but depending on spending options of subsidy-payments savings, it can improve growth and
household welfare in the long term. However, it will take years to materialize the full positive
impact of reform, especially for certain sectors and households. We also show that the complete
phaseout of subsidies over the coming years requires additional support for poor households,
especially the urban poor.
Yemen
Being one of the poorest countries in the world, the Republic of Yemen continues to experience
the devastating effects of its smoldering civil war. Violent conflict has severely disrupted the
economic activity, caused significant infrastructural damage, and led to a wide suspension of
essential public services (World Bank 2019a). The current state of its economy is unknown be-
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cause the maintenance of its formerly regular statistics has suffered significantly. Reconstruction
planning using conventional methods is very limited. To address these problems, my co-authors
and I build a CGE model of Yemen and use it to investigate the economic consequences of the
conflict and analyze the country’s potential recovery prospects (chapter 2, ‘Modeling conflict
impact and post-conflict reconstruction: The case of Yemen’). We use the latest available
pre-war data and statistics and apply the CGE model to estimate Yemen’s current economic
and poverty status quo. Furthermore, given the country’s uncertain reconstruction prospects,
we introduce uncertainty into the CGE model for the post-conflict reconstruction simulations.
We find that supporting agriculture and mining activities should be the policymakers’ highest
priority, as this is estimated to be the fastest way for the country’s revival. At the same time,
even if Yemen succeeds in offsetting all conflict-related shocks, reaching the pre-conflict eco-
nomic status quo is very unlikely without institutional reforms that had for decades restrained
qualitative improvements in productivity, investment, and technological flexibility (World Bank
2015). In this context, our findings thus suggest that stabilization of the country in the longer
term will require additional assistance beyond the reconstruction of the damaged assets and
sectors.
Senegal
In the case of Senegal, my co-authors and I focus on its agricultural sector. Being a typical
less developed country in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA), Senegal still heavily relies on agriculture
(USAID 2017), and the most critical aspects of its national development policy are focused on
the rural economy (World Bank 2020b; African Development Bank 2010). In this dissertation,
my co-authors and I consider two crucial problems of Senegalese agriculture.
In single-authored chapter 3 (‘Parameter Uncertainty in Policy Planning Models: Using
Portfolio Management Methods to Choose Optimal Policies under World Market Volatility’),
I address the problem of prioritizing Senegalese agricultural value chains under the uncertain
world markets. Over the last years, the Senegalese government has prioritized the rice sec-
tor (Liesbeth et al. 2013), but this policy might be sub-optimal in the context of significantly
increased volatility on the international markets (World Bank 2020c). To represent the uncer-
tainty of world markets, I sample model parameters of export/import prices and suggest that
besides policy return estimates, the policy options should also be analyzed from the risk per-
spective (similar to finance). When applied to the Senegalese agricultural policy, the method
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shows that prioritizing the rice sector remains the most effective policy in terms of expected
economic return (income generation and poverty reduction). However, this policy is also associ-
ated with the highest risk/uncertainty and can lead to an increase in poverty under unfavorable
but realistic world market scenarios. Like portfolio diversification in finance, mixed policies that
require the rice sector to be promoted in combination with other sectors such as milk, vegeta-
bles, oilseeds, or fisheries can provide risk mitigation at the expense of lower expected policy
return.
In chapter 4 (‘The Role of Global Climate Change in Structural Transformation of Sub-
Saharan Africa: Case Study of Senegal’), my co-authors and I shift the focus towards Global
Climate Change (GCC) and its role in the structural transformation of the Senegalese economy.
The country has been experiencing a rural exodus since the 1960s, with most of the provincial
migrants joining the informal urban sectors (Goldsmith 2004; WB 2018). In the context of
GCC, the country’s deagrarianization and fundamental transformation can be expected to am-
plify in the coming decades, and it becomes essential to understand these patterns. To model
GCC’s impact, we use a combination of biophysical and economic models and assume that
deagrarianization will be the primary adaptation strategy of rural households in Senegal. Our
results suggest that GCC can increase the country’s deagrarianization pace, with industrial
and service sectors in the capital Dakar being the most important destinations of the former
agricultural labor force. Although expected urbanization allows smoothing spatial income dis-
parities, the informal services sector’s absorption of mostly uneducated agricultural labor can
hamper the country’s long-term growth prospects. One of the policy options that can prevent
premature deindustrialization (see Rodrik 2015) can be services’ productivity increase to push
the former agricultural labor towards industrial sectors.
All in all, while the first two chapters focused on Egypt (chapter 1) and Yemen (chapter 2)
represent classic cases of a country-specific policy prioritization problem, chapters 3-4 dedicated
to Senegal have a stronger methodological focus. Although we address policy prioritization
problems of Senegalese agriculture in these chapters, the extensions of CGE modeling are also
applicable to other developing countries and development studies. Thus, besides addressing
topical economic and social policy questions, this dissertation also contributes to literature
strands focused on economic modeling.
All papers presented in this dissertation are either already published, submitted for publi-
cation, or prepared for submission in peer-reviewed journals.
Chapter 1
Energy Subsidy Reform for Growth
and Equity in Egypt: The Approach
Matters
This chapter is published as:
Breisinger, C., Mukashov, A., Raouf, M. and Wiebelt, M. 2019. “Energy Subsidy Reform for
Growth and Equity in Egypt: The Approach Matters.” Energy Policy 129: 661-671.
The full article can be downloaded at
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.02.059
Abstract
Phasing out energy subsidies is high on the agenda of policymakers in several Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) countries. The impact of such reform can vary widely depending
on the country and policy. This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the
phasing out of energy subsidies in Egypt under alternative economic scenarios. In particular,
we consider Egypt’s short- and long-term economic adjustment under different assumptions on
labor market flexibility, spending options of subsidy savings, and alternative social protection
measures. Results from economy-wide model simulations suggest that energy subsidy cuts may
hamper economic growth in the short term, but depending on the policy measure, will improve
growth perspectives and household welfare in the longer term. Yet, findings also point to likely
adverse impacts of the reform on household consumption in the short and longer run. To
counteract such negative impacts, targeted social protection measures should be continued and
scaled up in parallel with the phasing out of energy subsidies.
Keywords: economic development, poverty, energy subsidies, social protection, computable
general equilibrium model, Egypt.
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Chapter 2
Modeling Conflict Impact and
Post-conflict Reconstruction: The Case
of Yemen
A previous version of this chapter has appeared as:
Breisinger, C., Engelke, E., Mukashov, A. and Wiebelt, M. 2020. “Model-based planning for
post-conflict reconstruction: The case of Yemen.” MENA RP Working Papers 29.
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
doi:10.2499/p15738coll2.133736.
The paper has been revised and submitted for publication at Economic Systems .
Abstract
Evidence-based planning for in-conflict countries is often constrained by missing data and the
lack of appropriate analytical tools. To overcome these constraints, we use a CGE model
combined with Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (SSA) to investigate the impact of conflict on
Yemen’s economy and to analyze potential post-conflict recovery pathways. Our results suggest
that conflict-related disruptions in agriculture and mining sent devastating shockwaves through-
out the economy, constituting the lion’s share of the country’s economic losses and increase in
poverty. Results suggest that supporting agriculture should have the highest priority as the sec-
tor’s reconstruction has the largest positive impact on growth and poverty reduction, followed
by the mining sector. However, our estimates also highlight the importance of institutional
reforms and qualitative improvements in productivity, investment, and technological flexibility
to reach at least pre-conflict development levels. In addition to serving as a direct input for
Yemen’s reconstruction process, our paper also demonstrates the usefulness of economywide
models for conflict and post-conflict assessments.




Assessing economic and social consequences of armed conflicts requires rigorous research meth-
ods that usually involve the use or collection of extensive economic and social data1. While
such studies are essential for understanding and managing local wars and conflicts (Blattman
and Miguel 2010), policymakers of in-conflict or coming-out-of conflict countries often do not
have access to sufficient data and analytical instruments. Depending on the conflict intensity,
consistent data are usually only available from periods before the conflict, and in some coun-
tries, the maintenance of otherwise regular statistics also suffers significantly during times of
conflict. However, as countries move from an emergency or conflict mode to a recovery and
development mode, evidence-based planning is essential for national governments and their
international partners. Key questions often include: What is the status quo of the economy
and households’ incomes? Which conflict shocks contributed the most to economic and social
deterioration? What should government and its international partners prioritize to bring a
country on a recovery path? This paper tries to answer these and related questions for the case
of Yemen by using a CGE modeling approach.
The current crisis in Yemen erupted in 2011 when the events of the Arab spring led to
the resignation of the long-ruling president Saleh. After several years of political turbulence,
the full-fledged armed conflict began in March 2015, when the exiled interim president Hadi
formally sought the military intervention of the Arab Coalition to restore his government. Since
then, the conflict has caused massive physical damage, devastated the economy, and led to an
unprecedented humanitarian crisis (World Bank 2019a). Various third parties have been trying
to broker ceasefire and peace agreements, and the first positive signs emerged at the end of
2020/beginning of 2021, when the UN-led political talks allowed for positive developments in
the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement signed in November 2019 (OSESGY 2020; U. S.
Department of State 2021). In parallel to the political process, the Yemeni government and its
international partners have been trying to estimate conflict damages in their Dynamic Needs
1. For example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) construct a ‘synthetic’ control region and use real macro-level
per annum (p.a.) data to estimate the economic costs of the outbreak of terrorism in the Basque Country in the
1960s. Justino and Verwimp (2012) uses a panel of households surveyed before and after the conflict in Rwanda
(1994) to investigate how the conflict affected poverty. Ganegodage and Rambaldi (2014) use macro-level annual
data over the period 1960-2008 to evaluate the impact of civil war in Sri Lanka (1983 to 2009) on its economic
growth. Mercier et al. (2020) use a three-wave panel survey to investigate the relationship between exposure to
the civil war in Burundi (1993 to 2005) and household food poverty.
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Assessment (DNA) reports. This process has been very challenging, and the estimates in many
instances rely on strong assumptions (World Bank 2019a). Moreover, formerly regular official
statistics such as national accounts and budgets and household income and expenditure surveys
have not been updated since 2014. As a result, to estimate the current state of the economy at
least at an aggregated level, international organizations often have to rely on anecdotal evidence
(World Bank 2019b).
In this context, our paper complements existing studies and aims to provide essential de-
tails on the country’s economic damages and potential reconstruction opportunities based on
an innovative approach. We use available fragmented DNA estimates made by the various or-
ganizations and integrate them into our CGE model for Yemen calibrated to the pre-war year
of 2014. We use the model to simulate the degradation of the economic activity and household
income throughout the conflict phase of 2015-2020 and assume that the country’s reconstruc-
tion process will start in 2021. Then we use the standard five-year reconstruction planning
period (World Bank 2017b, 2017a) and use the model to project the possible economic state of
the country by the year 2025.
In the data scarcity environment, reference to the simulation models is relatively standard
practice, and several studies used simulation methods (including CGE models) to estimate
impacts of otherwise unmeasurable shocks such as sanctions, disasters, population displacement,
and terrorism2. In the case of Yemen, the CGE modeling approach was used to analyze the
effects of the 2008 flood on the economy and food security (Breisinger et al. 2015), to measure
the impact of the 2008-09 global crisis on growth and poverty (Breisinger et al. 2011), and
to assess country’s social and economic situation after the ’Arab spring’ unrest in 2011-12
(World Bank et al. 2012). To our knowledge, this paper is among the first that uses the CGE
simulation approach to assess the economic costs resulting from the conflict-related damages
and shocks. As the scope of Yemen’s economic losses associated with the recent armed conflict
remains largely unknown, our paper attempts to provide a timely estimate of the conflict and
post-conflict economic and social developments in the country.
We find that Yemen’s most severe economic losses are associated with disruptions in the
mining and agriculture sectors, contributing to the loss of 20.9 and 9.4% of GDP to the over-
all estimated contraction of 36% of GDP between 2014-2020. Altogether direct and indirect
2. See Gharibnavaz and Waschik (2017), Siddig and Mohammed (2017), and Agbahey et al. (2016) (sanc-
tions); Zhou and Chen (2020) and Tan et al. (2019) (disasters); WB (2017) and Alix-Garcia et al. (2017)
(population displacement); Nassios and Giesecke (2017) (terrorism).
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consequences of the conflict led to catastrophic outcomes for the population. According to our
estimates, the poverty rate increased by 31.3% from the pre-conflict poverty level of 48.6%
(Government of Yemen 2014) and reached 79.9% of the population, with a particularly dev-
astating situation in rural areas, where nine out of ten residents now live below the poverty
line.
Our simulations of the post-conflict reconstruction phase suggest that recovery of the mining
sector and agriculture are the most effective channels for economic revival. However, even
with the complete offset of all conflict-related shocks, restoration of the pre-war status quo
is very unlikely without institutional reforms that had restrained qualitative improvements of
the economy for decades even before the conflict (World Bank 2015). The country’s recovery
prospects look even gloomier in the light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic and other not-yet
properly quantified factors such as human capital depreciation or fluctuations in remittances.
Thus, our findings serve as a first important step in understanding Yemen’s reconstruction
potential and feasibility of its stabilization in the coming years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the used data, method-
ology, and model. Section 2.3 discusses the simulation results for both conflict and recovery
phases. Section 2.4 concludes with a summary and policy recommendations.
2.2 Data and Methodology
2.2.1 Pre-conflict economic and social status quo
The central database for our model is the SAM for the year 2014 constructed by Raouf et
al. (2019). It is based on the national accounts (2014), household survey (2014), industrial
survey (2013), and it already accounts for the economic and social deterioration in the country
due to the ‘Arab spring’ events of 2011-12. The SAM thus captures the latest available macro-
and micro-level data and allows us to analyze the country’s economic and social characteristics
before the full-fledged outbreak of the armed conflict in March 2015.
Even before the conflict, Yemen’s economy had many features (Table 2.1) that characterize
the least developed countries (Schwab and Sala-i-Martin 2014). In particular, the country
heavily relied on the primary sector (12.6 and 23.0% of the GDP are agriculture and mining),
had a relatively underdeveloped secondary sector (e. g., non-food manufacturing is only 1.7%
of GDP), and a relatively high share of the government sector (11.4% of GDP). Furthermore,
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the country heavily depended on imports of many essential goods (e. g. food and petroleum),
while the mining sector (crude oil and natural gas) dominated exports. In this context, it
is important to emphasize that the hydrocarbon rents constituted the backbone of Yemen’s
political and economic systems, with other sectors heavily depending on the trickle-down effects
of oil rents (World Bank 2015).










Crops 7.8 8.3 8.8 26
Livestock 3.4 4.6 1.8 1.3
Other agriculture * 1.4 1.4 35.1 2.5
Mining 23 1.5 56.7 27.8
Food processing 6.5 20.7 9.9 26
Other manufacturing 1.7 15.2 10.6 67.7
Utilities 1.6 1.5 - -
Construction 3.1 8.6 - 3.7
Wholesale and retail trade 16.7 10.7 - -
Transportation and storage 8.8 9.4 5.5 27.3
Housing 3.9 1.9 39.7 6.7
Information and communication 1.7 1.3 - -
Business services 3 3.1 15 39.5
Other private services 5.9 4.4 - 6.5
Public goods and services 11.4 7.5 3.1 -
Total 100 100 15.3 22.9
Source: Own calculations based on Raouf et al. (2019).
Note: * ‘Other agriculture’ is primarily capture fisheries (95%), with some forestry (5%).
The structure of factor payments in Yemen was also typical for low-income countries (Table
2.2). The economy was labor-intensive, with labor contributing 60.7% of GDP at factor cost.
While capital-value added share was 34.5%, more than its half (18.9%) was associated with
the mining sector. As in most countries, urban households enjoyed higher incomes than rural
residents (Table 2.3). Per-capita consumption of urban households was 72.6% higher, and
the poverty incidence in urban areas was 2.5 times lower than in rural communities. These
disparities can be partly explained by different income sources and educational differences
between urban and rural households. Yemen’s urbanization was low, with 71% of the Yemeni
population living in rural areas.
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Share of factor income,
rural households,%
Share of factor income,
urban households,%
Labor - uneducated 22.1 32.1 18.4
Labor - secondary 9.2 12.7 8.8
Labor - tertiary 29.4 22.9 56
Land 4.8 7.3 3.6
Capital - crops 0.5 1 0.2
Capital - livestock 0.4 0.7 0
Capital - mining 18.9
23.3 13.1
Capital - other 14.8
Source: Own calculations based on Raouf et al. (2019).







’000 Yemeni Rial (YER)
Rural 18.5 59.2 194.4
Urban 7.8 23.9 335.4
Total 26.2 48.6 236
Source: Own calculations based on Raouf et al. (2019) and Government of Yemen (2014).
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In summary, Yemen was already among the world’s poorest countries in 2014, with an
annual GDP per capita of United States Dollar (USD) 1,351 (290,000 YER), and almost half
of the population living below the poverty line.
2.2.2 Integrating information on conflict-related shocks into the
model
We begin our estimations with the compilation of the fragmented estimations made by various
international organizations on the conflict-related economic shocks (Table 2.4). The shocks
are assumed to be directly or indirectly associated with the armed conflict and estimated as a
percentage change by 2020 to the levels of 2014.
Table 2.4: Yemen: available estimates on the conflict-related shocks, 2020 vs. 2014 in %.





of the capital assets*
World Bank (2019a)








World Bank (2020e) Production -50
World Bank (2020a) World Market Prices (crude oil) -58
Financing of the current
account deficit
IMF (2020) USD inflows -48.5
Note: *we use the cost-based assessments of the DNA report (replacing destroyed capital
assets are as-sessed at 100%, partially damaged capital assets are assessed at 40%). Detailed
information is given in Appendix 2.A.
Physical destruction of capital assets. The World Bank (2019a) report relies primarily on
remote data sources, including satellite imagery and social media analytics, and provided a
cost-based assessment of the capital assets damages in the largest 16 urban centers.
Disruptions in agriculture. FAO (2018b) uses a different approach and directly estimates
production reduction in the crop and livestock sectors. The report emphasizes the deterioration
of the public sector and overall economic disorganization as the leading cause of the country’s
agricultural degradation. In particular, in the context of regular droughts, flash floods, and
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water scarcity typical for the country, FAO (2018b) emphasizes the conflict-related degradation
of the government’s water management services, irrigation, control of plant pests and diseases,
and other public services. In the livestock sector, the conflict caused the displacement of herds of
agropastoral households, reduced veterinary services, and led to the spread of endemic diseases.
Disruptions in the mining sector. Like FAO (2018b), the World Bank 2018 (Policy Note 2)
highlights Yemen’s institutional deterioration as the main reason for the hydrocarbon sector’s
halt. The report emphasizes tremendously increased operating costs of the mining companies
due to continuous insecurity, increased compensation needs, and backlog in infrastructural
maintenance. All these factors forced companies, including state-owned enterprises, to virtually
halt operations with the outbreak of violence in 2015. However, according to the latest available
data, production of hydrocarbons begun to be revived in recent years (primarily due to resuming
of operations by Yemen’s state-owned hydrocarbon enterprises) and reached 50% of the pre-
conflict production level by the beginning of 2020 (World Bank 2020e). However, the industry’s
longer-term revival is highly uncertain due to the recent unprecedented shocks on the global
energy markets (World Bank 2020a; 2020c), which raises doubts about the sustainability of
production plans to increase output.
Financing of the current account deficit. Given the problems of the hydrocarbon sector,
official assistance through grants and loans is a critical source of foreign exchange in the import-
dependent Yemeni economy (World Bank 2019c). By the end of 2020, the USD 2 billion Saudi
Arabian emergency assistance is near depletion, and other large inflows of official assistance are
not (yet) announced (World Bank 2020f). We use the latest available data and projections by
the IMF (2020) and estimate the current account deficit changes over 2014-2020.
The compiled information on the conflict shocks is then integrated into the Yemeni CGE
model (Table 2.5). We use the standard recursive-dynamic CGE model developed by the
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and adjust it to reflect specific shock
transmission channels of the Yemeni economy. In particular, the estimates of the physical
destruction of the capital assets in housing, utilities, transport, and the public sectors are
expressed in our model as a shock that decreases capital production factors. Consequently,
the reduction of their output is endogenous and defined via the Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) production function. To model disruptions in agriculture and mining, we fix
their output through the Leontief function and assume underutilization of respective capital
assets. Furthermore, we simulate the observed drop of oil prices in the world markets and
the drop of foreign assistance inflows. Finally, in line with the expectations about increased
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(formal) unemployment and land use reduction (World Bank 2019a; FAO 2018b), labor and
land production factors are allowed to be unemployed in our model. While official estimates
on unemployment and agricultural land use are not available, we expect that together with
reduced capital, underutilization of land and labor factors will significantly affect GDP and
households’ welfare.
Table 2.5: Yemen: functional forms and closures of the CGE model.
Block Category Form / closure
Production
Primary factors CES or Leontief (mining and agriculture)
Intermediates Leontief
Top of technology Leontief
Households Consumption Linear Expenditure System (LES)
Trade
Import CES
Export Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET)
Closures
Numeraire
Consumer Price Index (domestic producers price
level is flexible)
Government
Fixed government tax rates with (dis)savings
adjusting to available net revenues
Savings/Investment
Neoclassical closure (the sum of total savings defines
investment)
Rest of the World
The nominal exchange rate is flexible while the
current account balance and world market prices are
given exogenously (conflict shocks for mining)
Factors
Capital is immobile across sectors and given
exogenously (conflict shocks for housing, utilities,
transport, and the public sectors); Labor and land
might be unemployed
Source: Own compilation based on Diao and Thurlow (2012). Details are in Appendix 2.B.
It is important to mention that our model simulations are based on the latest available
information on conflict shocks. Several other important but not yet quantitatively formu-
lated factors are not taken into account in our model. Among others, these factors include
the COVID-19 pandemic and fluctuations in remittances, human capital depreciation due to
2.2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 15
malnutrition, diseases, or increased qat3 consumption (UNICEF 2021; Tshiband 2019).
2.2.3 Modeling the uncertainty of post-conflict reconstruction
We use the standard five-year planning horizon (World Bank 2017b, 2017a) and assume that
the country’s reconstruction can start in 2021. We also assume that reconstruction is financed
directly by the international community, bypassing the government budget and without repatri-
ating profits. This assumption is justified since most of the finance and required assets likely to
be provided directly by international partners and organizations in line with the past recovery
financing experience in Yemen (e. g. FAO 2018b; World Bank 2019a). At the same time, we
refrain from associating the magnitude of the policy interventions with their monetary costs.
While FAO (2018b) and World Bank (2019a) provide sector-specific estimates of the neces-
sary reconstruction funds, these estimates are subject to further elaborations4, and the actual
financing needs to restore production in the mining sector are not well understood.
As Yemen’s reconstruction prospects remain highly uncertain (World Bank 2020f), we use
the method of SSA that allows us to reflect post-conflict uncertainty. SSA is becoming popular
in the recent CGE-based studies as it addresses the topical problem of parameter uncertainty
in CGE modeling. Most importantly, SSA implies treating parameters of interest as random
variables that are sampled from assumed or estimated distributions. The method produces
varying endogenous variables, whose variations are analyzed instead of point estimates produced
by standard CGE scenarios (see e. g. Webster et al. 2008; Phimister and Roberts 2017;
Chatzivasileiadis et al. 2018).
Table 2.6 describes the set of model parameters representing the reconstruction phase in our
analysis. Given the lack of data, we assume uniform distributions and sample each parameter
from the 0-1 range, where 0 corresponds to stagnation (no change since 2020), and 1 corresponds
to complete recovery to the pre-conflict level of 2014 by 2025.
Besides conflict shocks, we also consider the country’s potential for qualitative improve-
ments. In a pre-war study, the World Bank analyzed Yemen’s institutions and highlighted
reforms that can boost growth by removing constraints in productivity growth, investment,
and labor reallocation (see World Bank 2015 for details). Our analysis represents these fac-
3. Addictive flowering plant that contains psychoactive agents.
4. For example, the DNA study by the World Bank (2019a) concentrated solely on the largest 16 urban
centers, for which reconstruction needs are estimated to reach USD 14 billion; however, extrapolated to the
entire country, total reconstruction needs are projected to reach USD 32 billion.
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Table 2.6: Yemen: CGE parameters of the reconstruction period (values by 2025).
Name Variable Min Max
Physical damages dest 2020 level complete recovery to 2014 level
Agriculture agri 2020 level complete recovery to 2014 level
Mining mini 2020 level complete recovery to 2014 level
Current account fsav 2020 level complete recovery to 2014 level
Oil world market prices prwo 2020 level complete recovery to 2014 level
Qualitative improvements inst 2020 level
1 % p.a. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth
+100% to capital investment effectiveness
+100% to productivity elasticities
Source: Own compilation.
Assumptions: prwo is independent; all other parameters are perfectly correlated.
tors through umbrella parameter ins that encompasses CGE parameters representing TFP, the
transformation of investment into new capital stock, and production elasticities of substitu-
tion. We assume that inst = 0 corresponds to no TFP growth, no improvements in capital
investment, and pre-war production elasticities of substitution (see Table 2.10 in Appendix);
inst = 1 corresponds to 1% of annual of TFP growth and 100% increase of model parameters
that represent the transformation of capital investment into new capital stock and production
elasticities of substitution.
Furthermore, in order to identify the contribution of each policy to the total reconstruction
uncertainty, we define six sample-scenarios:
1. only dest parameters are sampled, all other reconstruction parameters are fixed at the
conflict level of 2020 (various scenarios of reconstruction of physically destroyed capital
are considered);
2. only dest and agri parameters are sampled, all other reconstruction parameters are fixed
at the conflict level of 2020 (various scenarios that assume both reconstructions of phys-
ically destroyed capital assets and agriculture are considered);
3. same as sample (2) + parameter mini (recovery of mining);
4. same as sample (3) + parameter fsav (foreign assistance recovery);
5. same as sample (4) + parameter inst (qualitative improvements);
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6. same as sample (5) + parameter prwo (world market prices of hydrocarbons);
For each of the defined sample-scenarios, we sample parameters from respective dimensions
of the multivariate uniform distribution specified in Table 2.6, each with a sample size of 100
simulations. To technically perform the sampling, we use the R-package ‘EnvStats’ by Millard
(2013)5.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Conflict phase, 2015 to 2020
This section discusses the simulation results for the conflict period. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 present
the decomposition of losses of the economic sectors and household welfare over the conflict
phase (percentage change with respect to the pre-war levels of 2014 by the year 2020).
Our results suggest an overall GDP loss of 36.0% (Table 2.7), which corresponds well with
some of the World Bank’s more anecdotical-based estimates6. The loss of production factors in
sectors affected by the conflict directly contributed to the loss of GDP and household welfare.
However, the indirect economywide repercussions had more pronounced effects on the country.
According to our estimates, the physical destruction of capital assets in housing, utilities,
transport, and the public sector contributed to only 0.6% of total GDP reduction over 2015-
2020. The most severe economic losses were associated with disruptions in the mining and
agriculture sectors. The direct conflict-related reduction of the value-added in mining and
agriculture constituted 11.5 and 4.4% of GDP7 , but the economywide repercussions associated
with these sectors contributed to 20.9 and 9.4% of GDP losses, respectively. Reduced foreign
assistance to finance the current account deficit contributed to another 5.1% of GDP loss.
Model results at the sector level suggest that fishery (part of the ’other agriculture’ sub-
sector) and manufacturing (food and non-food) were the most resilient sectors during the con-
flict. These sectors were the sole recipients of the country’s remaining income, and other eco-
5. We use Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) method. See Millard (2013) for details.
6. Initial estimates suggested Yemen’s GDP contracted by more than 50% during the conflict (World Bank
2018); however, later the estimate was reduced to 39% (World Bank 2019b), and in late-2018, Yemen’s economy
began to show signs of stabilization and demonstrated moderate growth in 2019 (World Bank 2019c).
7. GDP shares in 2014: 7.8% crops; 3.4% livestock; 23% mining (see Table 2.1); the total reduction of
production (by 2020 wrt 2014): crops: 38%, livestock: 41%; mining: 50%. Direct conflict-related reduction of
the value-added (by 2020 wrt 2014): agriculture: 7.8%*(0.38) + 3.4*(0.41)=4.36%; mining: 23%* (0.5)=11.5%.
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nomic activity in the country plummeted. While food is essential for household consumption
(as is evident in the low-income elasticities of demand, see Table 2.10 in Appendix), Yemen’s
rudimentary manufacturing sector benefited from constrained imports due to foreign exchange
shortages and supplied intermediates for the remaining economy. Other economic activity, es-
pecially non-essential services, experienced the most severe GDP losses due to economywide
spillovers associated with reduced household and government income. In turn, the construction
sector that could have absorbed economic shocks, collapsed, following a sharp increase in the
government budget deficit and shrinking investment demand.
Table 2.7: Yemen: decomposition of the economic losses, 2020 vs. 2014 in %
Sector Total Destruction Agriculture Mining
Current
account
Total GDP -36 -0.6 -9.4 -20.9 -5.1
Crops* -38 0 -38 0 0
Livestock* -41 0 -41 0 0
Other agriculture 5.6 -0.7 -1.4 2.9 5
Mining* -50 0 0 -50 0
Food manufacturing -1.6 -0.4 -1.6 -0.5 0.8
Other manufacturing 0.9 -0.8 -1.5 5.4 -2.2
Utilities -31.8 -1.1 -15.3 -11.5 -3.9
Construction -69.5 -1.6 -7.7 -31.3 -28.9
Wholesale and retail trade -31.5 -0.5 -11.3 -13.6 -6.2
Transportation and storage -46.5 -1.4 -10.2 -22 -12.9
Housing -42.4 -4.3 -8.2 -20.7 -9.2
Information and communication -73.8 -0.9 -14.3 -36.8 -21.8
Business services -36.1 -1.1 -5.1 -17.2 -12.7
Other private services -69.2 -0.5 -15 -37.9 -15.7
Real investment -78.5 -1.8 -8 -34.8 -33.8
Government budget deficit 77.4 4.2 13.3 52.6 7.3
Real exchange rate** 8.3 -0.7 3.4 0.4 5.3
Source: Yemen CGE model.
Notes:*The production of the sectors is fixed (conflict shocks).
**The simulations do not consider currency devaluation caused by monetary policy actions.
In terms of distributional impacts, the model results indicate that rural and urban residents
experienced relatively similar losses in their welfare, with an overall reduction of per-capita
consumption of 43.2% and the national poverty level increasing from 48.6% in 2014 to 79.9%
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Table 2.8: Yemen: decomposition of the household losses, 2020 vs. 2014 in %
Sector Total Destruction Agriculture Mining
Current
account
Per-capita real consumption -43.2 -12.8 -8.5 -17.2 -4.7
Rural -42.1 -8.4 -9.8 -18.7 -5.2
Urban -47.1 -21.8 -6.6 -14.8 -4
Poverty level* - national 79.9 55.6 7.5 13.5 3.3
Rural 89.1 64.8 8.5 13 2.8
Urban 61.7 37.4 5.5 14.4 4.4
Rural labor income -39.2 -0.3 -13.3 -17.6 -8
Rural capital income -45.3 -0.9 -2.3 -43.1 1.0
Rural land income -38 0 -38 0 0
Urban labor income -35.4 0.4 -10.4 -18.9 -6.5
Urban capital income -55.3 0 -2.7 -53.8 -55.3
Urban land income -38 0 -38 -38 -38
Source: Yemen CGE model.
Notes:*Poverty headcount by 2020.
by 2020. At the same time, the urban population experienced a more significant relative increase
in poverty prevalence than did the rural population – the poverty headcount rose by half for the
rural population (from 59.2 to 89.1%), while for the urban population, it more than doubled
(from 23.9 to 61.7%). However, as poverty in rural areas was much higher than in cities before
the conflict, the situation in rural areas is particularly devastating, with nine out of ten rural
Yemenis living below the poverty line.
2.3.2 Post-conflict recovery phase, 2021 to 2025
Having estimated the impact of the conflict shocks on the Yemeni economy, in this section, we
analyze its potential recovery scenarios. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and Table 2.9 present the spectrum
of the country’s reconstruction trajectories, where we investigate the importance of each policy
in the total post-conflict uncertainty in line with the samples defined in Subsection 2.2.3.
The range of Yemen’s possible recovery trajectories varies significantly. Under the worst-
case scenario that assumes no reconstruction of the conflict damages, real GDP over 2020-2025
is expected to grow on average by 0.7% per year (Table 2.9). However, given the projected
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Figure 2.1: Yemen: real GDP and employment estimates, 2014-25.






























Source: Yemen CGE model.
Table 2.9: Yemen: sectoral GDP (p.a. growth rates with respect to estimated 2020 levels).
Sector worst dest & agri & mini & fsav & inst & prwo
Total GDP 0.7 1.1 4 7.9 9.2 12.9 13.2
Agriculture 0.3 0.3 8.9 8.9 8.9 10.2 9.9
Mining 0 0 0 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9
Food manufacturing 1.1 1 1.2 1.5 2 6.4 5.8
Other manufacturing 1.6 1.3 1.6 2.1 3.5 12.4 8.8
Utilities 0.5 0.6 5.5 6.5 7.3 10.1 10.9
Construction 1.1 -3.2 3.1 8.4 19.8 25.5 28.9
Services 0.9 1.8 4.6 6.3 8.2 13.6 14.3
Source: Yemen CGE model.
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+ agri + instdest + mini + fsav + prwo
Source: Yemen CGE model.
growth of the population (see Table 2.11 in Appendix), the per-capita and poverty indicators
are expected to deteriorate further (e.g., see the lowest trajectory of per-capita consumption
in Figure 2.2). The reconstruction of the physically destroyed capital assets can provide only
+0.4% of average annual GDP growth (Table 2.9), which is not enough to achieve positive per-
capita growth rates (see the bounds of dest in Figure 2.2). With the additional reconstruction of
agricultural activities, household income can be stopped from further deterioration (see +agri
in Figure 2.2). While the complete reconstruction of agriculture to its pre-conflict levels can
provide +2.9% of annual GDP growth (Table 2.9), the mining sector’s revival is the most
effective way for economic recovery even at the current meager world market prices. If the
mining sector production reaches 100% of its pre-conflict level, it can provide +3.9% of annual
GDP growth (Table 2.9). However, given the importance of agriculture for household incomes,
compared to mining, its revival has a more significant effect on the real per-capita consumption
(approximately +3.1% of annual growth for agriculture compared to +1.8% for mining, see
+agri and +mini in Figure 2.2). The recovery of foreign assistance inflows to finance the
current account deficit can provide another +1.3% of annual real GDP growth (Table 2.9),
which is still insufficient to reach pre-war GDP by 2025 (see +fsav upper bounds in Figure
2.1). If the country succeeds in the ultimate phase-off of all conflict-related shocks, its economy
can be expected to grow very fast (on average, 9.2% per year, see fsav in Table 2.9), but given
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the growth of population, it will still be far away from the pre-war income and poverty levels
(see +fsav bounds in Figure 2.2).
Nevertheless, the improvements in productivity, investment, and technological flexibility
can boost the economy by another 3.7% of annual GDP growth, with manufacturing and
service sectors being the primary recipients of the qualitative economic shift (Table 2.9, inst).
Only under qualitative improvements that lead to booming secondary and tertiary sectors,
the country reaches its potential GDP growth rates, with the labor supply being restricted
by population growth rates (see +inst upper bounds in Figure 2.1). Yet, according to our
estimates, the country reaches its pre-war poverty level by 2025 only in those cases that on top
of the best-case reconstruction scenarios assume recovery of the oil world markets (see +prwo
bounds in Figure 2.2).
2.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have applied an economywide CGE modeling approach to determine the im-
pact of war in Yemen on its economy and households. For this purpose, we have compiled
publically available, albeit fragmented sector-focused data and estimates from various interna-
tional organizations and integrated them into a CGE model calibrated to the pre-war year of
2014.
Our simulation-based findings suggest that the most severe economic and welfare losses are
associated with conflict-related disruptions in the mining and agriculture sectors. These two
key sectors’ repercussions sent devastating shockwaves throughout the economy, contributing to
20.9 and 9.4% of GDP loss of the total estimated contraction of 36% of GDP between 2015-2020.
Consequently, recovery of these sectors’ activities should receive the highest priority as their
recovery is estimated to produce the fastest way for the country’s socio-economic revival. At the
same time, our estimates suggest that even if Yemen succeeded in offsetting all conflict-related
shocks, reaching the pre-conflict economic and poverty status quo is very unlikely without insti-
tutional reforms and qualitative improvements in productivity, investment, and technological
flexibility. In addition to a significant boost of the recovery pace, qualitative improvements can
positively affect the economy’s structure and divert its reliance on the hydrocarbon rents in the
post-conflict era. However, as the country could not implement such reforms for decades before
the conflict (World Bank 2015), such scenarios seem to be optimistic in the short-run and in
light of the recent COVID-19 crisis and human capital depreciation factors not accounted for
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in our model. Given the established interrelationship between poverty and armed conflicts (see
e. g. Stewart 2002; Ikejiaku 2009; Braithwaite et al. 2014), our findings thus suggest that
stabilization of the country in the longer term will require additional assistance beyond the
reconstruction of the damaged assets and sectors.
In the context of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment conducted after the conflict
(World Bank 2019a), our simulation-based methodology can be used in countries with circum-
stances similar to the current fragile situation in Yemen. Simulation-based estimates can serve
as the first important step for understanding the reconstruction potential and stabilization
prospects of a country and thus complement the arsenal of other methods and models feasible
at the later stage of post-conflict development.
2.A Calculation of the physical destruction of the
capital assets
DNA reports conducted by the World Bank are not fully publicly disclosed (e. g. Bayoumy
2016; World Bank 2017b). However, the reports’ most critical excerpts are stated in publicly
disclosed Country Engagement note (World Bank 2019a: 7). In particular, the note states that:
• the housing sector suffered the worst damage, with 32% of houses partially damaged and
1% destroyed;
• education, health, transport, water supply, sanitation, and hygiene sectors experienced
damage ranging from 27 to 31%.
We then use the methodological conventions of standard DNA of the World Bank, according
to which the costs of replacing destroyed assets are assessed at 100%, while those for partially
damaged assets are assessed at 40% (World Bank 2017a: 5). Thus, we assume that the housing
sector’s capital stock was reduced by (32 x 0.40) + (1 x 1.00) = 13.8%. For the costs of
replacing destroyed assets for utilities, in the transport sector, and the public sector, we use
the median of the disclosed range of damage (27 to 31%) and assume that 29% of the capital
of these sectors was damaged, resulting in an 11.6% capital loss (29 x 0.40).
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2.B Yemen CGE model
We use the standard IFPRI CGE model developed by Löfgren et al. (2002) and Diao and
Thurlow (2012). General mathematical statements of model equations are similar to those of
the Egypt model (Chapter 1).






Income elasticities of demand
Rural h-holds Urban h-holds
Crops Leontief - 0.3 0.3
Livestock Leontief - 1 0.6
Other agriculture 0.2 1.3 1 0.6
Mining Leontief - 1.8 2.3
Food processing 1.1 3.13 0.6 0.5
Other manufacturing 1.3 3.1 1.5 1.7
Utilities 1.3 - 0.9 0.7
Construction 1.7 1.9 1 0.8
Wholesale and retail trade 1.3 - 2.1 2
Transportation and storage 1.3 1.9 2.1 2
Housing 1.3 1.9 2.4 1.9
Information and communication 1.3 - 2.4 1.9
Business services 1.3 1.9 2.4 1.9
Other private services 1.3 1.9 2.4 1.9
Public goods and services 1.3 1.9 - -
Frisch parameter (LES) – – -5.5 -4.5
Source: Aguiar et al. 2016 (production and trade); Breisinger et al. 2011 (income); Ramprakash
et al. 1979 (Frisch).
As the country moves from an emergency mode to a development mode, we adjust the model
closures defined in Table 2.5. For the period 2020-2025, we assume that for the non-controlled
sectors, the newly generated capital (depends on the investment in the previous year) is mobile
across sectors, and its distribution depends on the patterns of capital rent distribution paid by
each sector (see the ‘putty clay’ assumption in Diao and Thurlow 2012 for more details). We
also assume that until reaching the upper threshold of the available labor force, labor factors’
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supply is perfectly elastic; after reaching respective threshold levels, labor factors’ growth is
restricted by the population growth, and the markets adjust through varying wages.
Table 2.11: Yemen: population projections, rural and urban, 2015-25.
Type 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Total growth, % 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2 2 1.9 1.9
Rural growth, % 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1 1 0.9
Urban growth, % 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 4 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6
Total, millions 26.9 27.5 28.1 28.8 29.4 30 30.6 31.2 31.9 32.5 33.1
Rural, millions 18.8 19.1 19.3 19.6 19.9 20.1 20.3 20.5 20.8 21 21.1
Urban, millions 8.1 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.5 9.9 10.3 10.7 11.1 11.5 11.9
Source: UN 2019.
Table 2.12: Yemen: labor supply upper thresholds, thousands of workers, 2015-25
Type 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Rural uneducated 979 994 1,008 1,022 1,035 1,048 1,060 1,071 1,082 1,092 1,102
Rural secondary 2,916 2,960 3,002 3,043 3,082 3,119 3,155 3,189 3,222 3,252 3,282
Rural tertiary 131 133 135 136 138 140 141 143 144 146 147
Urban uneducated 422 440 459 478 497 517 537 558 579 600 622
Urban secondary 1,256 1,310 1,365 1,422 1,479 1,538 1,599 1,660 1,723 1,787 1,852
Urban tertiary 56 59 61 64 66 69 72 74 77 80 83
Source: World Bank 2020d (labor force by skill), and UN 2019 (rural and urban population).
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Abstract
This paper suggests using portfolio management methods in policy planning models as a prac-
tical tool for determining optimal policy under model parameter uncertainty. We suggest that
in addition to calculating the standard policy return estimates, policy options should also be
analyzed from the risk perspective by using metrics that inform the effect of parameter uncer-
tainty on policy impact variation. We demonstrate the approach in a CGE model that analyzes
pro-poor agricultural value chains in Senegal under world market uncertainty. We show that
prioritizing the rice sector is the most effective policy in terms of expected policy return, but
this policy is also associated with the highest risk, leading to an increase in poverty under
unfavorable yet realistic scenarios. Much like diversified portfolios in finance, mixed policies
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that assume the rice sector’s promotion combined with other sectors such as milk, vegetables,
oilseeds, or fishery, can offer risk reduction at the cost of reduced expected policy return.
Keywords: policy analysis; CGE modeling; portfolio management; pro-poor growth.
3.1 Introduction
Modern evidence-based policy requires to quantitatively formulate the impact of policy options
considered by policymakers. One of the standard tools utilized for such purpose is the CGE
modeling (Dixon and Rimmer 2016; Taylor 2016; Henning et al. 2018). This type of model-
ing allows estimating the economywide implications of potential policy shocks, and in various
fields, CGE models are used to compare policy options and define optimal policy intervention1.
However, policy conclusions based on the classic deterministic CGE models can be corrupted
by exogenous model parameter uncertainty. Reparameterization of a CGE model can affect
the quantitative and even qualitative impact of policy simulations (e. g., Fugazza and Maur
2008; Olekseyuk and Schürenberg-Frosch 2016; Phimister and Roberts 2017), and comparative
analysis of policy options in a standard deterministic fashion might not allow defining optimal
policy.
This paper suggests using Portfolio Management (PM) methods in CGE-based policy plan-
ning models as a practical tool for defining optimal policy under model parameter uncertainty.
In addition to the standard policy impact estimates, I suggest analyzing policy options from
the risk perspective, with indicators of policy impact variation caused by parameter uncertainty
being used as volatility/risk metrics. Like in portfolio theory, then policy options are explicitly
characterized by both policy return and risk perspective, and the selection of optimal policy
depends on policymakers’ risk/return preferences (Markowitz 1952; Markowitz 1959; Sharpe
1994). To my knowledge, this is the first paper that suggests the use of portfolio theory in
CGE-based studies.
1. For example, Ojha et al. (2013) use a CGE model of India and compare economic and distributional
consequences of policies that promote growth of physical capital, human capital or technological progress. Liu
et al. (2015) use China’s financial CGE model to investigate the effectiveness of various monetary policy options
in response to oil price shocks. Ge and Lei (2017) use China’s bioethanol CGE model and argue that demand
incentives are better than supply incentives for GDP growth, energy saving, and emission reduction. Benfica
et al. (2019) use a CGE model of Mozambique and show that the government should have reallocated resources
towards agricultural research and extension, as this is the most effective policy at raising growth and reducing
poverty in all regions of the country.
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I apply the approach to the CGE-based analysis of agricultural value chains in Senegal.
Poverty reduction and pro-poor growth are declared as of the most important goals of the
country (World Bank 2020b; African Development Bank 2010), and many studies demonstrate
that agriculture remains the most significant sector in achieving these goals (e. g. Diao et
al. 2010; Valdés and Foster 2010; Klasen and Reimers 2017). However, developing a country-
specific pro-poor agricultural policy requires a comparative analysis of each agricultural value
chain (e. g. Pauw and Thurlow 2015; Chhuor 2017; Benfica and Thurlow 2017; Otchia 2018;
Ferrari 2018).
In the case of the Senegalese CGE model with a focus on agricultural policy planning, the
set of model parameters representing world markets is essential. In the context of increased
volatility on the international markets (World Bank 2020c), and recommendations for the pol-
icymakers in developing countries to explore counter-cyclical mechanisms for external shocks
(FAO 2011), the standard assumption about constant world market prices in policy planning
models becomes particularly weak. Therefore, to explicitly account for the world market uncer-
tainty when analyzing Senegal’s agricultural value chains, I use portfolio management methods.
As a domain of endogenous policy outcomes, I consider the Poverty-Growth Elasticities (PGE)
of ten primary agricultural sectors, and as a domain of uncertain model parameters, I consider
the Rest of the World (RoW) parameters - that is, the world market prices and the country’s
current account. Similar to financial portfolio management, I treat indicators representing
expected PGE and its variation due to RoW volatility as return and risk metrics of policy
options. Furthermore, because PGE of agricultural sectors are not perfectly correlated (due
to different production structures, trade characteristics, economic linkages, etc.), I consider
portfolio diversification methods that can offer risk reduction (for a given return) or increase of
return (for a given risk). In addition to standard sector-specific policy comparison scenarios, I
sample mixed-policy scenarios and estimate the PGE of all policy scenarios under various RoW
scenarios.
I demonstrate that a policy that exclusively promotes the rice sector is the most effective in
poverty reduction when only looking at expected policy return, but this option is also associated
with the highest risk. Under the least favorable RoW scenarios, this policy can even lead to an
increase in poverty. Mixed policies that assume the rice sector’s promotion combined with other
sectors can offer risk reduction at the costs of expected return. I show that the promotion of
milk, vegetables, oilseeds, or fishery sectors can mitigate the risks associated with the country’s
reliance on the rice sector. Given the government’s current prioritization of the rice sector
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in response to the 2008 food crisis (Liesbeth et al. 2013), portfolio management principles’
suggested application can be particularly beneficial for Senegal’s practical policymaking.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the CGE
modeling literature that addresses model parameter uncertainty and describes the suggested use
of portfolio methods in the CGE-based policy studies. Section 3.3 describes the application to
the analysis of the Senegalese pro-poor agricultural value chains. Finally, section 3.4 highlights
the potential implications for policy analysis and concludes.
3.2 Portfolio management methods in CGE modeling
Policy choices based on the estimates and point predictions produced by deterministic models
can be very fragile, as policy conclusions often rest on critical assumptions, and communication
of the uncertainty either of the researchers with the policymakers or of the policymakers with
the public can be rarely found in practical policy analysis (Manski 2011). In CGE modeling,
the choice of exogenous model parameters is critical, as it can often affect the quantitative and
even qualitative impact of policy simulations (see e. g. Fugazza and Maur 2008; Olekseyuk
and Schürenberg-Frosch 2016).
As a response to this problem, the concept of SSA, popularized by Arndt and Pearson (1998),
is increasingly used in CGE-based studies. The concept addresses the problem of parameter
uncertainty by treating exogenous CGE parameters as random variables. The SSA implies
estimating the variation of CGE endogenous variables of interest by sampling exogenous model
parameters from assumed or estimated distributions. For example, Valenzuela et al. (2007)
suggest using the SSA to validate the global agricultural CGE model by sampling output shocks
and comparing simulated and historically observed price volatility in various world regions.
Webster et al. (2008) use the SSA to address the uncertainty in projections of emissions and
atmospheric stabilization costs for five climate scenarios. Phimister and Roberts (2017) use the
SSA to investigate the implications of allowing uncertainty in exogenous shocks when modeling
a new onshore wind sector in North East Scotland. Chatzivasileiadis et al. (2018) conduct
SSA to address parameter uncertainty when analyzing the effects of sea-level rise on the global
economy. Mukashov et al. (2019) and Ziesmer et al. (2020) extend SSA’s principles to policy
parameters and demonstrate how the model uncertainty can affect policy impact estimations
and optimal policy choice.
Methodologically this paper follows recent literature strands and uses the SSA methods
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to represent the impact of parameter uncertainty on endogenous variables of interest. How-
ever, its peculiarity is the suggestion to integrate SSA methods into the portfolio management
framework.
The approach is mainly targeted at those cases when a comparison of policy options under
standard SSA methods fails to define optimal policy. Specific policy options might be robustly
superior regardless of the model’s reparameterization. In this case, SSA sampled parameters
and scenarios affect policy impact estimates, but not policy rankings themselves. However, if
policy scenarios are not robust under certain SSA reparametrizations (e. g., Fugazza and Maur
2008; Olekseyuk and Schürenberg-Frosch 2016), it becomes difficult to define univocally optimal
policy. As a solution to this problem, I suggest explicitly representing risk/return trade-offs of
policy options and use portfolio management principles to select an optimal policy.
The important prerequisite to refer to portfolio management tools is the standard tools’
inability to define optimal policy. Therefore, as a first step, it is necessary to investigate impor-
tant shock transmission mechanisms of a specific model and define the set of uncertain model
parameters that can significantly affect policy impact estimates. The SSA methods should then
be used to compare policy options under the uncertain exogenous model parameters; if none of
the policies is robustly superior under the SSA sampled scenarios, portfolio management tools
can be used.
Modern portfolio and risk management methods are very diverse, and the specifics of math-
ematical finance concepts are beyond the scope of this paper. In the application to CGE-based
analysis of agricultural value chains in Senegal, I use simple portfolio theory concepts defined in
Markowitz (1952), Markowitz (1959), Sharpe (1994), and Jorion (2006). To represent risk/re-
turn trade-offs, for each policy option, I calculate the average value of policy impact (represents
expected policy return), the standard deviation of policy impact (represents the volatility/risk
of a policy), and minimum policy impact (represents the worst-case policy return). Further-
more, much like diversified portfolios in finance, I consider diversified (mixed) policies. I rank
all policy options based on expected return or risk and represent a (sub)set of efficient policies
where higher expected return requires taking more risk, or lower risk requires lowering return
expectations. Thus, investors (policymakers) faced with a trade-off between expected return
and risk have to select an optimal policy based on their risk/return preferences.
Although the method does not offer a universal tool to define optimal policy, the suggested
application of portfolio management methods contributes to practical policymaking by offering
widely-known financial instruments for direct communication of model uncertainty with poli-
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cymakers. In this context, this framework can encourage policymakers to express their risk and
return preferences explicitly and, therefore, increase the transparency of their policy choices
(see Manski 2011, 2018, for more details).
3.3 Agricultural policy in Senegal under the world
market uncertainty
3.3.1 The standard approach to define the pro-poor agricultural
value chain
I use the recursive-dynamic CGE model of the IFPRI developed by Löfgren et al. (2002) and
Diao and Thurlow (2012) and the 2015 SAM constructed by Randriamamonjy and Thurlow
(2019). I select five years as the simulation horizon (2020-2024)2 and tailor the SAM and model
to reflect specific adjustment possibilities of the Senegalese economy in the medium-term (see
appendix 3.A for more details).
As a set of policy parameters, I consider the TFP growth of ten primary agriculture sectors
(table 3.1, columns 1-2). TFP increase means that a country can increase output with the
same available production factors (capital, labor, and land). Consequently, households (who
own most of the country’s production factors) should receive a higher income and increase
consumption. In turn, TFP increase of agricultural sectors should particularly benefit poorer
rural residents3, who own most of the agricultural capital, labor, and land. However, depending
on the sectors’ structural characteristics, the effectiveness of specific sectors within agriculture
might vary significantly.
Following Wiebelt et al. (2020), who conducted the standard CGE-based policy analysis of
the Senegalese agricultural value chains, I define standard TFP sectoral scenarios such that 1%
growth of total agriculture by 2024 is achieved uniquely by respective sectors (table 3.1, column
6). Then, obtained policy impact estimates represent sectors’ effectiveness in poverty reduction
per 1 percent of agricultural growth. Therefore, I define policy impact estimates under standard
2. Years 2015-2019 are run in the background to approximate already known developments.
3. Per-capita consumption of rural households is 3.7 times lower than of urban residents; poverty incidence
in rural areas is 57 percent compared to 26 percent in Dakar and 41 percent in other cities (Randriamamonjy
and Thurlow 2019; ANSD 2013).
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Table 3.1: Senegal, PM: considered agricultural sectors.













[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Sorghum and millet sorg 1.46 - 0.0 1.49 -1.04 10
Rice rice 1.15 19.4 53.6 2.94 0.84 1
Groundnuts gnut 1.01 6.0 0.0 2.70 -0.53 9
Other oilseeds oils 1.48 4.3 1.2 1.91 -0.40 7
Vegetables vege 1.78 10.2 4.6 1.49 -0.38 6
Fruits frui 1.55 7.4 3.9 1.30 -0.40 7
Cattle catt 1.21 0.0 0.2 2.53 -0.30 4
Poultry poul 0.85 0.1 0.3 2.99 -0.30 4
Raw milk milk 1.20 - - 2.04 0.02 2
Fishery fish 1.43 8.2 0.0 2.22 -0.29 3
Source: Calculations based on Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019) and Senegal CGE model.
TFP sectoral scenarios as (semi) Poverty-Growth elasticities (PGE, table 3.1, column 74) and
rank sectors (table 3.1, column 8). I obtain a similar conclusion to Wiebelt et al. (2020) that
rice and milk are the only sectors that can reduce the national poverty headcount, with the
rice sector being outstandingly more effective than milk.
3.3.2 Uncertain model parameters
The rice sector’s estimated high effectiveness can be primarily attributed to its trade inten-
siveness (table 3.1, columns 4-5). The increased output should be absorbed by domestic or
external demand, and the trade intensive rice sector benefits from import substitution or ex-
port expansion opportunities, and ceteris paribus, can expand more than less tradable sectors.
These estimates are in line with Senegal’s actual agricultural policy, where the rice sector is
under the policymakers’ particular focus since the 2008 food crisis. The current national rice
policies consist of trade liberalization accompanied by massive investments to intensify domestic
production (Liesbeth et al. 2013).
However, this policy shock transmission mechanism’s effectiveness is based on the assump-
tion about constant RoW model parameters. If one assumes the downward price trend on
4. In order to operate with the term ‘return’ in the meaning similar to finance, I calculate PGE as percentage
difference of poverty headcount under the no-policy vs. policy scenario. In other words, positive PGE indicates
poverty reduction and vise-versa.
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the agricultural markets (e. g. 1985-1992 or 2011-2020, see figure 3.1), investing in tradable
sectors becomes less profitable, as they are expected to face increased price pressure from the
international markets. Under these conditions, the promotion of non-tradables can become a
more effective policy because of overall economywide effects.




















See Appendix 3.A.3 for sources and details.
This indirect channel’s effectiveness largely depends on the economic linkages between the
agroprocessing and primary agriculture sectors (table 3.2). Less tradable sectors have to reduce
prices because their increased output can be sold on the domestic markets without price com-
petition from the rest of the world. In turn, downstream sectors with a large share of affected
intermediate costs can reduce their own prices, which should lead to increased demand and
production (for example, grain/cereal milling can be expected to benefit from the fall of the
prices of sorghum and millet and increase production). At the same time, the performance of all
sectors, including non-tradables, can be susceptible to external volatility because of imported
intermediates (for example, all petroleum products and fertilizers in Senegal are imported).
In the context of increased volatility on the international markets (World Bank 2020a;
FAO 2011), the standard assumption about constant world market prices becomes particularly
weak, and the CGE model’s properties demonstrate that the agricultural sectors’ effectiveness in
generating income and reducing poverty can be sensitive to the RoW assumptions. Therefore, as
a domain of varying model parameters, I consider world markets, which, unlike other uncertain
but relatively rigid model parameters (e. g., trade elasticities), can change significantly and
affect medium-term agricultural policy planning.
As was demonstrated in 2007-08 and 2020, developing countries like Senegal are exposed to
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Table 3.2: Senegal, PM: linkages between agroprocessing and primary agriculture.
Sector Intermediate costs, % of which primary agriculture, %
Meat 41.1 69.7
Fish and seafood 49.0 77.5
Dairy 52.2 32.1
Grain/cereal milling 70.9 81.5
Fruits, vegetables & other 68.4 62.0
Beverages 48.5 39.9
Other foods 41.1 42.6
Cotton yarn & other 58.0 2.2
Leather & other 63.5 6.8
Miscellaneous non-food 68.5 10.0
Source: Calculations based on Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019).
the volatility on the international markets not only through the prices of tradable commodities
but also indirectly via the international capital flows that affect the exchange rate, investment,
and growth (World Bank 2020a; FAO 2011). Therefore, in addition to the price indices, I use
the current account deficit estimates by the IMF (2020) to represent the uncertainty in RoW
(table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Senegal, PM: varying exogenous model parameters.
Original data Mapping to CGE model Short
Agriculture index change of the world price of agricultural commodities pw agri
Manufactures Unit Value Index change of the world price of manufacturing products pw MUVi
Energy index change of the world price of energy commodities pw ener
Fertilizers index change of the world price of fertilizers pw fert
Metals & Minerals index change of the world price of metal or minineral commodities pw mtmn
CPI Services (France) change of the world price of services pw serv
Current account deficit change of foreign savings fsav
See appendix 3.A.3 for sources and details.
3.3.3 Systematic Sensitivity Analysis
Next, I consider standard sectoral PGE, but allow for the variation of RoW parameters. To
sample RoW scenarios, I follow Webster et al. (2008) and use the Latin Hypercube Sampling
from a multivariate Gaussian distribution. First, I estimate the mean and the variance of the
Gaussian distribution (see appendix 3.B for details) and treat sampled parameters as possible
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RoW scenarios (table 3.4). Then, I calculate PGE and rank the poverty reduction effectiveness
of agricultural sectors for each sampled RoW scenario (table 3.5).
Table 3.4: Senegal, PM: sampled RoW scenarios.
Scenario pw agri pw MUVi pw ener pw fert pw mtmn pw serv fsav
row1 4.89 2.58 7.78 0.67 -0.67 1.03 -6.94
row2 0.42 1.02 3.05 7.39 -7.41 1.50 16.07
row3 -3.11 -3.91 -11.54 -0.24 -5.73 0.11 -12.14
row4 2.48 -3.12 -1.87 12.58 3.52 2.64 7.31
row5 -5.46 -0.67 -5.99 -9.33 -10.37 2.29 1.59
row6 -0.89 -2.16 6.39 -2.66 4.89 -0.06 11.06
row7 -1.95 0.70 -8.96 -11.42 -3.70 2.07 -15.11
row8 3.60 3.62 -3.03 9.03 10.36 0.80 4.99
row9 2.29 1.86 12.19 3.23 0.10 0.47 -1.66
row10 -3.91 -1.65 0.99 -6.00 7.17 1.59 -5.95
Source: Author’s compilation. See appendix 3.B for details.
Rice is ranked as the most effective in poverty reduction in six of ten sampled RoW scenarios.
Under four scenarios (#3, 5, 7, 9), the rice sector’s promotion is a sub-optimal policy as other
sectors are more effective in generating income and poverty reduction. In particular, scenarios
#3, 5, and 7 assume an overall decrease of the world market prices, and under these scenarios,
the rice sector is ranked as one of the worst policy options. Less tradable sectors with stronger
upward linkages tend to become more efficient options under the overall low world market
prices (the groundnuts sector is the best option under scenario # 3, and fishery becomes
the best option under scenarios #5 and 7). Furthermore, under scenario #9, which assumes
high energy prices, the rice sector is less effective than vegetables. The non-tradable milk
sector, which has the second-highest PGE under the standard approach (table 3.1, column 7),
demonstrates its robustness and is ranked as a second or third best policy option under the
majority of scenarios.
Depending on the RoW scenario, different sectors are ranked as the most efficient in poverty
reduction, meaning that comparative analysis of agricultural policy options in a standard de-
terministic fashion does not define optimal policy.
3.3.4 Portfolio management methods
Having established the inability of standard tools to define optimal policy under the RoW
uncertainty, I refer to portfolio management methods and perform the comparative analysis of
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Table 3.5: Senegal, PM: sectoral ranking and PGE under different RoW scenarios.
Scenario Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Rank4 Rank5 Rank6 Rank7 Rank8 Rank9 Rank10
row1
rice vege gnut oils frui milk catt fish poul sorg
0.58 0.38 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.05 0.02
row2
rice oils vege catt fish milk poul gnut frui sorg
0.78 0.36 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.53
row3
gnut fish milk poul vege oils frui rice sorg catt
0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.33 -0.36 -0.41
row4
rice vege fish oils frui catt poul milk gnut sorg
0.31 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 -0.37 -0.57
row5
fish milk catt vege frui oils poul gnut sorg rice
0.66 0.65 0.52 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.18 0.16
row6
rice milk vege oils frui fish gnut catt poul sorg
0.61 0.18 0.08 0.07 0.07 -0.11 -0.18 -0.21 -0.21 -0.69
row7
fish milk gnut rice oils frui vege poul catt sorg
0.04 -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.29 -0.39 -0.41 -0.82
row8
rice milk oils vege fish frui catt poul gnut sorg
0.71 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.22 -0.36
row9
vege rice milk fish catt poul frui gnut oils sorg
0.38 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.20 -0.03 -0.03 -0.17 -0.32
row10
rice milk poul oils fish catt vege gnut frui sorg
0.10 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.16 -0.27 -0.29 -0.32 -0.34 -0.65
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
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policy options based on portfolio management principles.
In the context of my case study, besides the standard comparison of sectors, consideration
of mixed policies is necessary. By design of the CGE model, returns of considered agricultural
sectors are not perfectly correlated (different production structure, trade characteristics, eco-
nomic linkages, etc.), which means that portfolio diversification methods used in finance can
be applied to policy options to reduce the risk for a given return or increase the return for a
given risk. To cover the spectrum of possible mixed policies, I sample 1000 scenarios of various
combinations of the TFP shocks such that the growth of total agriculture for all scenarios is 1
percent by 2024 (see appendix 3.C for more details). In other words, simulations under mixed
policy scenarios assume that all agriculture’s weighted average TFP growth is 1 percent by
2024. Therefore, these scenarios’ estimated policy impacts are treated as PGE similar to the
standard comparative analysis of sectoral scenarios.
I treat indicators representing the expected poverty reduction as expected policy returns,
and indicators representing the volatility of poverty outcomes due to RoW scenarios as risk
metrics. It should be noted that such comparative analysis of PGE relies on the implicit
assumption that costs of productivity growth across all sectors of primary agriculture in Senegal
are constant and depend only on sectors’ size. In other words, I assume that agricultural sectors
of the same size for the same money should realize the same TFP increase. This assumption
is not unusual and can be met even in the literature strands that compare the effectiveness of
much more heterogeneous sectors (such as agriculture versus non-agriculture; see, for example,
Valdés and Foster 2010; Diao et al. 2010). However, a study by Henning et al. (2017) that
analyzed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program in Malawi demonstrates
that this assumption should be treated cautiously. Most importantly, the authors use the Cobb-
Douglas function and assume a diminishing marginal impact of budget spending on sectoral
TFP. Estimated exponent parameters of the crop sector (0.525) and livestock sector (0.363)
imply that the crop sector in Malawi, for the same money, should grow faster than the livestock
sector (in other words, crops have a higher potential for productivity growth than livestock).
Because the integration of this approach into this paper requires a lot of additional information
and estimation, I leave it for future work and assume that sectors of primary agriculture in
Senegal are technologically homogeneous.
Due to computational limitations, each policy scenario (including non-diversified options,
1010 scenarios in total) is simulated for ten exogenous RoW scenarios considered above (10100
simulations in total). Given sample restrictions, I do not use advanced mathematical finance
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methods that involve analyzing return distributions and applying the latest available modern
portfolio theory methods. To represent risk/return trade-off, I use simple metrics such as the
average value of PGE (represents expected return, E), standard deviation of PGE (represents
the volatility of expected return, σ), or minimum value of PGE (represents the worst-case
expected return of a policy, min).
Table 3.6: Senegal, PM: top five policies based on expected return E(PGE).
Policy
Weights/composition
E σ minsorg rice gnut oils vege frui catt poul milk fish
rice 100.0 0.30 0.38 -0.33
D361 1.2 45.8 4.7 2.2 12.6 3.4 1.7 3.8 23.6 1.0 0.20 0.22 0.00
D831 0.6 46.6 2.4 14.6 17.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.4 2.2 0.19 0.21 -0.04
D923 5.1 67.4 1.5 4.1 0.7 1.3 11.3 3.9 2.0 2.7 0.18 0.22 -0.04
D896 5.2 43.7 1.5 2.5 7.3 0.1 1.2 5.1 22.8 10.6 0.18 0.20 0.00
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
Table 3.7: Senegal, PM: top five policies based on worst-case return min(PGE).
Policy
Weights/composition
min E σsorg rice gnut oils vege frui catt poul milk fish
D361 1.2 45.8 4.7 2.2 12.6 3.4 1.7 3.8 23.6 1.0 0.00 0.20 0.22
D896 5.2 43.7 1.5 2.5 7.3 0.1 1.2 5.1 22.8 10.6 0.00 0.18 0.20
D767 1.0 55.7 7.5 0.2 3.6 5.8 3.6 8.2 3.4 11.1 0.00 0.18 0.22
D151 1.3 60.5 2.4 0.3 1.6 5.8 8.6 3.0 15.7 0.6 0.00 0.18 0.20
D766 4.9 50.0 5.0 3.3 4.7 10.2 1.2 5.3 4.8 10.7 0.00 0.17 0.20
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.




sorg rice gnut oils vege frui catt poul milk fish
D891 1.8 63.7 3.6 2.0 2.1 0.7 1.7 0.6 17.3 6.4 1.07 0.16 0.15
D896 5.2 43.7 1.5 2.5 7.3 0.1 1.2 5.1 22.8 10.6 0.94 0.18 0.20
D361 1.2 45.8 4.7 2.2 12.6 3.4 1.7 3.8 23.6 1.0 0.92 0.20 0.22
D831 0.6 46.6 2.4 14.6 17.6 4.3 4.4 3.9 3.4 2.2 0.91 0.19 0.21
D151 1.3 60.5 2.4 0.3 1.6 5.8 8.6 3.0 15.7 0.6 0.86 0.18 0.20
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
Table 3.6 shows the top five policies ranked based on expected return. The option that has
the highest expected poverty reduction is an exclusive promotion of the rice sector. However,
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this policy option is also associated with the highest volatility (highest standard deviation σ).
Under the least favorable RoW conditions, an exclusive promotion of the rice sector can even
lead to negative returns (min(PGE) is negative, which means an increase in poverty). Conse-
quently, policymakers might consider less risky options with a lower expected return. The next
four options with the highest return assume diversified promotion of several sectors and have
a much lower level of risk (≈ 60 percent less volatility), which comes at the cost of decreased
poverty reduction (≈ 50 percent less expected return). All four options are not significantly
different in terms of expected return and risk and assume the rice sector’s promotion in com-
bination with other sectors that demonstrate high returns under the specific RoW (table 3.5).
In particular, sectors with high weights besides rice are milk, vegetables, oilseeds, or fishery.
Another criterion used to rank policies is the worst-case return (represents the expected
return of a policy option under the least favorable RoW scenarios, table 3.7). This criterion
is a simplified version of the Value at Risk indicator used in finance to represent the risk of
loss for investments (Jorion 2006). The top five policy options guarantee non-negative returns
(all min = 0) and do not significantly differ in expected return or volatility. Like expected
return criteria, all options assume reliance on the rice sector with various combinations of other
sectors, mostly milk, vegetables, and fishery.
The last criterion that I consider is the Sharpe ratio (expected return E / standard deviation
σ, table 3.8) - an indicator used in finance to represent the reward to-variability metric (Sharpe
1994). Similar to the worst-case return criteria, an exclusive promotion of rice option does not
perform well under this criterion, and the five best options are diversified policies that assume
a mix of rice with other ’balancing’ sectors, the most notable of which are milk, vegetables, and
fishery.
Presented policy options reflect only a small part of the efficient set and do not include
all potential optimal policies. Risk/return preferences of policymakers not necessarily concen-
trate in the extreme return/risk domains; for example, policymakers might have a particular
appetite for a guaranteed positive outcome (for example, min(PGE) > 0.1) or volatility (for
example, σ(PGE) ∈ [0; 0.1], and concrete portfolio selection processes require analysis of the
respective parts of the efficient set. This task, however, requires complementary information
on the risk/return preferences of policymakers. In this regard, the demonstrated application of
portfolio management methods paves the way for future work on investigating various potential
optimums associated with the various risk and return preferences.
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3.4 Conclusion
In recent years many CGE-based studies apply the SSA concept to represent the impact of pa-
rameter uncertainty on policy impact estimates. However, in some studies aimed at comparing
policy options, using the SSA methods might be insufficient to define optimal policy interven-
tion. If none of the policy options is robustly superior, I suggest integrating the SSA methods
into the portfolio management framework. Similar to finance, indicators representing the ex-
pected policy impacts can be treated as expected policy returns, and indicators representing
the dispersion of policy impacts due to model reparameterization can be used as risk metrics.
Furthermore, much like diversified portfolios in finance, it might be beneficial to consider mixed
policies that can offer risk reduction for a given return or increase return for a given risk.
As a case study, I investigate pro-poor agricultural policy in Senegal and demonstrate that
a simple comparison of policy options under the SSA sampled RoW uncertainty scenarios does
not define optimal policy. Therefore, I apply portfolio management methods and analyze the
spectrum of agricultural policy options from a risk and return perspective. The policy that
exclusively promotes the rice sector is the most effective in poverty reduction in expected
policy return, but this option is also associated with the highest risk. Mixed policies that
assume rice promotion combined with promotion of other sectors can offer less risk at the
cost of reduced expected return. While the optimal policy’s exact determination depends on
policymakers’ risk/return preferences, it is possible to conclude that the promotion of milk,
vegetables, oilseeds, or fishery sectors can help to mitigate the risks associated with the current
country’s prioritization of the rice sector (Liesbeth et al. 2013).
The suggested concept can be used in other CGE-based studies aimed at comparing policy
options. A set of varying/uncertain model parameters and target outcomes can be adjusted
for specific research interests, and portfolio management methods can be used when the SSA
methods do not establish a robustly superior policy option. For example, many environmental
and ecological CGE models are naturally characterized by high uncertainty because they are
used for long-term simulations and projections (e. g. Webster et al. 2008; Chatzivasileiadis
et al. 2018). Consequently, the method can be especially useful in such models as it allows
applying commonly known portfolio management principles when it is necessary to select a
policy based on the risk/return trade-offs in a highly uncertain environment.
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3.A Senegal CGE model
3.A.1 SAM adjustments
The original SAM by Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019) has 462 accounts, including 262
(regionalized) production activities or sectors, 75 commodities, 45 (regionalized) factors of pro-
duction, 65 (regionalized) household types, and other institutional, tax, and savings or invest-
ment accounts. However, some accounts in the SAM were incompatible with our theoretical,
empirical, or computational limitations. In particular:
• Certain commodities are reexported (export > domestic production);
• Certain sectors, factors, or households are tiny and can cause computational problems for
the GAMS solver;
• Public goods and services are produced and consumed by both private and public entities.
Due to these incompatibilities, I perform the following adjustments:
• I net out imports for those commodities that have the reexport problem;
• Sectors or commodities that are less than 0.5 percent of GDP or absorption are aggregated
with the closest matching sectors or commodities;
• Household and factor accounts are aggregated within regions;
• Public goods and services are consumed and produced only by the public sector. This
amendment allows emphasizing that public goods and services should be outside of the
consumers’ demand function and that the prices of these specific goods are determined
by production costs only.
The resulting SAM (available upon request) has 263 accounts, including 183 accounts repre-
senting (regionalized) activities, 48 accounts representing commodities, 12 accounts represent-
ing primary production factors, 9 accounts representing households.
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3.A.2 Functional forms and closures
I define functional forms and closure rules for the Senegalese CGE model based on the standard
IFPRI CGE model by Löfgren et al. (2002) and Diao and Thurlow (2012). General mathemat-
ical statements of model equations are similar to those of the Egypt model (Chapter 1).
Table 3.9: Senegal, PM: CGE functional forms and closures.











The exchange rate is the model numeraire5;
Consumer Price Index and domestic
producers’ price level are flexible;
Rest of the World
the current account balance and world
market prices are given exogenously
(exogenous shocks)
Government
Fixed government tax rates; (dis)savings
adjust to available net revenues;
Savings/Investment Balanced closure6
Factors Fully employed and mobile7
5. The exchange rate of the CFA franc to the French franc (and later euro) is fixed since 1994. See Boogaerde
and Tsangarides (2005) for details.
6. ‘S-I’ closure 4, with enterprises adjusting marginal propensity to save. See Löfgren et al. (2002) for details.
7. Capital: ‘putty-clay’ assumption, see Diao and Thurlow (2012) for details.
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3.A.3 Sources used to define model parameters
Used SAM and selected functional forms and closures define the set of CGE parameters, and I
use different sources, estimates, and approximations to assign fixed parameter values.
• I use approximations and assumptions when the necessary estimates are not available.
For example, I use Aguiar et al. (2016) to define values of elasticity parameters;
• based on the observed productivity decline over 2006-2015 (see IMF 2017b for more
details), I assume zero productivity growth for all non-policy sectors;
• I use Euro as a trade currency and convert USD growth rates of world market prices to
Euro or French Franc growth rates;
• full parameter specification of all model simulations is available upon request.
Table 3.10: Senegal, PM: sources used to define CGE parameters.
Parameter Used sources
Non-policy TFP Own assumption based on IMF (2017b)
Factor supply
ILO (2020) for labor; FAO (2020b) for land;
Feenstra et al. (2015) for economywide capital
Population UN (2019)
World market prices
World Bank (2020a) and FRED (2020) for
services
Current account deficit IMF (2020)
Production and trade elasticities Based on Aguiar et al. (2016)
Income elasticities
Own estimates based on ANSD (2013) and King
and Byerlee (1978)
Frisch parameters
Own estimates based on ANSD (2013), World
Bank (2020d), and Ramprakash et al. (1979)
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3.B Sampling RoW scenarios
• I use the same sources as in 3.A.3 and construct the historical sample of p.a. growth rates
throughout 1980-2019 and estimate moments of the multivariate Gaussian distribution
(Table 3.11);
• I use LHS implemented in the R-package ‘EnvStats’ by Millard (2013) and sample RoW
scenarios from dimensions of specified multivariate Gaussian distribution;
• in order to avoid computational problems with the GAMS solver in the final years of
model simulations, I truncate 0.1 percentiles from left and right.
Table 3.11: Senegal, PM: means, standard deviations and correlations for RoW scenarios.
pw agri pw MUVi pw ener pw fert pw mtmn pw serv fsav
mean 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.26 0.00
σ 11.41 8.23 23.95 24.32 20.55 2.84 30.96
pw agri 1.00 0.69 0.41 0.65 0.50 0.11 0.21
pw MUVi 0.69 1.00 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.03 0.12
pw ener 0.41 0.43 1.00 0.43 0.43 -0.09 0.40
pw fert 0.65 0.44 0.43 1.00 0.38 0.05 0.61
pw mtmn 0.50 0.41 0.43 0.38 1.00 -0.05 0.18
pw serv 0.11 0.03 -0.09 0.05 -0.05 1.00 0.00
fsav 0.21 0.12 0.40 0.61 0.18 0.00 1.00
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3.C Sampling of mixed-policy scenarios
• I use R-package ‘xsample’ by Meersche et al. (2009) to sample 1000 mixed policy scenarios;
• the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method produces sampled solutions for the underdeter-
mined problem with linear equality constraints:
10∑
i=1
shareitfpi = tfptot subject to tfpi > 0 (3.1)
where sharei is share of sector i in total agricultural GDP;
tfpi is sampled TFP shock of sector i;
tfptot = 1 is the targeted TFP growth of the whole agriculture (1 percent by 2024);
• produced sample is distributed (jointly) uniformly over the feasible space of TFP pa-
rameters, and I assume that the sample size of 1000 scenarios is sufficient to cover the
parameter space of potential policy options.
Chapter 4
The Role of Global Climate Change in
Structural Transformation of
Sub-Saharan Africa: Case Study of
Senegal
The paper is published as:
Mukashov, A., Henning, C., Robertson, R., and Wiebelt, M. 2021. “The Role of Global
Climate Change in Structural Transformation of Sub-Saharan Africa: Case Study of Senegal.”




With increasing evidence that rural households in sSA opt for deagrarianization as an adap-
tation strategy to climate change, it is becoming important to understand the role of GCC
in ongoing structural transformation processes in these countries. We use Senegal as a case
study country and analyze how various GCC scenarios affect the country’s economic sectors,
households’ welfare, and structural transformation patterns. Our simulation results suggest
that GCC can increase the country’s deagrarianization pace, with industrial and service sectors
in the capital Dakar being the most important destinations of the former agricultural labor
force. Although unplanned urbanization caused by GCC smoothes its overall negative impact
and decreases spatial income disparities, uncontrolled deagrarianization is also associated with
negative externalities. Previous growth-focused studies suggest that services partaking in labor
deagrarianization can hamper country’s long-term growth prospects. Our results suggest that
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productivity increase of service sector can reduce its labor demand and thus redirect part of
the former agricultural labor force towards industrial sectors.
Keywords: CGE modeling; climate change; deagrarianization; urbanization.
4.1 Introduction
With the growing certainty in various GCC projections and scenarios, quantification of GCC-
associated economic and social consequences is becoming a top priority of researchers and
policymakers worldwide. Due to the natural relationship of climate characteristics and agricul-
ture (Dell et al. 2014), vulnerable agriculture-dependent countries and regions receive particular
attention (Mertz et al. 2009). Significant efforts have been made to quantify GCC scenarios’
impact and explore agriculture-focused adaptation strategies in various developing countries
and regions (e. g. Kurukulasuriya et al. 2006; Mendelsohn 2008; Calzadilla et al. 2013; Arndt
and Thurlow 2014; Wiebelt et al. 2015; Siddig et al. 2020). While these studies provide impor-
tant insights on GCC-associated economic and social consequences, surprisingly little attention
has been given to climate change in the context of ongoing structural transformation processes
in developing countries.
GCC-associated challenges in sSA represent particular research interests. For decades it
has been observed that sSA countries do not follow classic structural transformation patterns1.
Bryceson (1996) is among the first to cite statistical evidence and notes that despite industrial-
izing a little, sSA is becoming less rural in character. She emphasizes that the industrial sector,
being easily outcompeted by developed countries, is not the primary driver of rural exodus and
urbanization. She suggests applying the distinct concept of ‘deagrarianization’ for sSA and
using a sectoral perspective to analyze off-farm activity diversification of rural households. In
more recent studies, McMillan et al. (2014) and Rodrik (2015, 2016) also apply a sectoral ap-
proach and similarly note industrialization problems in sSA countries. With increasing evidence
that rural households in sSA opt for deagrarianization and rural outmigration as adaptation
strategies to GCC (Mertz et al. 2008; Connolly-Boutin and Smit 2015), understanding eco-
nomic transformation patterns of these countries becomes even more important. How can
various GCC scenarios affect fundamental economic structure and labor reallocation? Which
economic regions and sectors suffer, and which might eventually benefit from the structural
1. See Syrquin (1988) and Herrendorf et al. (2014) for overviews on the topic.
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transformation? What policies might be necessary to influence these processes? This paper
attempts to answer these and related questions based on the case study of GCC in Senegal.
Like many other sSA countries, Senegal is characterized by very uneven economic and social
development, with the capital Dakar being more developed and wealthier than other provinces.
The country has been experiencing a rural exodus since the 1960s, with most of the provincial
migrants joining the non-official urban sectors (Goldsmith 2004; WB 2018). Although historical
evidence suggests that rural outmigration decisions are more complex and might include non-
income factors (e. g. Brockerhoff 1990), the search for a better job and income remains the
self-declared primary driver of rural exodus in Senegal (FAO 2018a, 2020a). In the context of
the lingering significance of agriculture for most of Senegal’s rural population (USAID 2017),
GCC thus can be expected to trigger the country’s deagrarianization and affect the fundamental
structure of its economy.
To model GCC’s impact on the Senegalese economy, we use biophysical and economic
workhorse models developed by the IFPRI. We use the IFPRI’s International Model for Policy
Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) model to produce GCC scenar-
ios that affect the country through agricultural productivity and world market prices. Then
IMPACT GCC scenarios are passed on to the IFPRI-type CGE model designed for the Sene-
galese economy.
Our simulation results demonstrate that although GCC’s overall impact is expected to be
relatively moderate, it can still impact economic structure and contribute to existing regional
imbalances. Agriculture, being already significantly less productive than other sectors2, is
directly exposed to the GCC-associated productivity shocks and becomes even more ineffective.
We expect labor to be pushed out of agriculture and into both industry and services. This
effect is the most significant for uneducated labor, which is intensively employed in Senegalese
agriculture. Rural households are expected to deagrarianize either by joining nonagricultural
sectors in their provinces or, depending on the interregional mobility, offer their labor in the
other regions with higher wages. The most developed and the least agricultural, the Dakar
region suffers only from the indirect, general income losses, and its activities are expected to be
the most attractive destinations for the former agricultural labor force. Provincial industrial
and service activities that could have grown due to local deagrarianization, with increasing
interregional labor mobility, become less attractive than wealthier Dakarian counterparts. As
2. The average farmer is more than six times less productive than the average counterpart in the rest of the
economy (Seck 2016)
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a result, the capital Dakar can become even more economically important at other regions’
expense.
Although urbanization resulting from non-interventional policy smoothes the overall nega-
tive impact of GCC and decreases spatial income disparities, previous growth-focused studies
suggest that policy interventions should be considered too. McMillan et al. (2014) and Ro-
drik (2015, 2016) argue that in sSA rural labor movements towards unproductive and informal
urban services is growth-reducing phenomenon that blocks off rapid industry-led growth and
transformation similar to South Asian countries. In this context, services partaking in Sene-
gal’s deagrarianization can hamper its long-term growth prospects, and we additionally conduct
simulations to analyze potential policies to influence these processes. Our results suggest that
productivity increase of services sector can reduce its labor demand and thus redirect part of the
former agricultural labor force towards industrial sectors. Although not being optimal policy
in terms of immediate growth effects (compared to a productivity increase of industrial sec-
tors themselves), productivity boost of services can essentially push uneducated labor towards
industry and pave the way for rapid growth through industrialization.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the existing
economic and social status quo and outlines GCC scenarios’ major shock transmission channels
that impact the Senegalese economy. Section 4.3 presents simulation results and analyzes
scenarios of Senegal’s economic transformation. Section 4.4 highlights the potential policy
implications and concludes.
4.2 Vulnerability of the Senegalese economy to GCC
4.2.1 Economic and social status-quo
We begin our analysis by investigating pre-existing vulnerabilities of the Senegalese economy
to GCC. As our primary data input, we use the SAM3 constructed by Randriamamonjy and
Thurlow (2019). The SAM represents the state of the Senegalese economy in 2015, and, unlike
standard national SAMs, it represents activities, households, and factors on the regional level
(Table 4.1). Thus, our SAM allows us to account for each region’s economic and social specifics
3. The SAM (available from the authors upon request.) uses macro- and micro-level data such as national
accounts, input-output tables, household surveys and consistently represents a detailed snapshot of the economy
for selected year. See Breisinger et al. (2009) for detailed explanation of the concept.
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Table 4.1: Senegal, GCC: mapping between administrative and SAM regions.
Administrative SAM region
Dakar Dakar









and conduct our analysis on both regional and national levels.
Senegal has economic structure similar to other least developed countries (Schwab and Sala-
i-Martin 2015). In particular, the country has a high share of primary sectors (18.7% of GDP is
primary agriculture and mining, see Table 4.2), low industrialization (14% of GDP), and high
reliance on imported industrial products (33% of consumption, of which one third is imported).
At the same time, on the regional level, these patterns are not homogeneous. In particular,
our SAM captures the more developed status of the capital Dakar, and its neighboring regions
(Thi Dio), where most of the economic activity is represented by the secondary and tertiary sec-
tors. Other regions (Center, North, and South) heavily rely on primary agriculture (GDP share
of agriculture varies from 40 to 60%) and are underdeveloped even by the national standards.
Similar developmental disparities can be observed in the regional breakdown of the house-
hold types (Table 4.3). The share of non-urban residents is significantly higher in the rural
provinces (Center, North, and South), where the households involved in farming activities vary
from 48.8 to 71.5%. The latest FAO survey conducted in 2020 reveals that most of these house-
holds are small-scale subsistence farmers who rely on informal family labor (FAO 2020a). As
a result, already in 2015, Senegal is characterized by significant income disparities across its
regions. The poverty line in Dakar is almost two times higher than in rural areas, and even
with that, the (weighted) average poverty incidence among farmers is 64% compared to only
26% in Dakar (ANSD 2013).
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Table 4.2: Senegal, GCC: economic structure, 2015.
Total, %
of which (within), %
crops oagr mini agpr oind serv padm
National GDP 100.00 9.26 6.20 3.17 9.38 14.08 52.34 5.57
Dakar 55.34 0.73 0.44 2.18 8.68 16.86 63.91 7.21
Thi Dio 17.22 5.49 5.10 5.24 10.15 16.59 53.99 3.44
Center 9.05 38.47 20.48 1.70 5.26 6.21 26.14 1.73
North 10.10 21.03 18.58 6.56 16.57 8.67 23.12 5.47
South 8.29 27.76 16.23 2.97 8.19 5.58 35.86 3.41
Export in output 10.27 7.36 2.38 23.84 15.83 14.15 7.65 -
Consumption 100.00 7.68 4.20 2.86 14.35 32.74 34.51 3.66
of which import 18.21 19.52 0.37 38.51 14.05 32.60 8.42 -
Note: crops = crops production; oagr = other agriculture (livestock, fishery, forestry);
mini=mining; agpr = agroprocessing; oind = (other) industry; serv = services; padm = public
administration.
Source: Calculations based on Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019).
Table 4.3: Senegal, GCC: households structure, 2015.
Population % below poverty line
Total, %
of which, %
All URB FAR NFR
URB FAR NFR
National 100.00 43.79 46.04 10.16 46.71 33.03 64.42 36.91
Dakar 23.68 100.00 0.00 0.00 26.10 26.10 - -
Thi Dio 24.65 28.26 55.80 15.94 45.04 31.15 64.01 31.40
Center 10.78 35.83 48.83 15.35 41.60 50.10 41.00 28.23
North 21.36 19.09 71.44 9.46 54.19 31.09 63.46 41.52
South 19.53 26.67 60.24 13.09 68.45 55.94 74.62 61.96
Note 1: URB = urban households; FAR = rural farm households; NFR = rural non-farm
households.
Note 2: Poverty lines (p.a. per-capita consumption per adult equivalent in constant 2015 thou-
sand CFA franks): Dakar: 370; other urban: 295; rural: 221.
Source: Calculations based on Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019) and ANSD (2013).
52
4.2.2 Modeling GCC shocks and economic transformation
To produce the GCC scenarios that can affect the Senegalese economy, we use the IMPACT
model developed by the IFPRI. For each of the three climate model scenarios used here,
the IMPACT model produces estimates of region-specific crop productivity shocks and world
market prices (detailed description of the model can be found in Calzadilla et al. 2013; Robinson
et al. 2015).
Given our focus on the whole economy’s structural transformation, we have to extrapolate
beyond IMPACT’s basic outputs. The IMPACT model focuses on the most common crops,
and it does not produce GCC impact estimates for livestock and fishery, which constitute
40% of the primary agriculture in Senegal (see Table 4.2). At the same time, climate experts
emphasize that these two agricultural sub-sectors will also be directly affected by GCC in
Senegal. For the livestock, the impact is expected via heat stress and reduced productivity
through reduced water and forage resources; for the fishery, the impact is expected via rising
surface water temperatures and ocean acidification, altering species’ reproduction migration
(USAID 2017). Furthermore, the IMPACT model does consider region-specific crops (e. g.,
cassava and other local fruits and vegetables). Therefore, given our focus on the fundamental
structural transformation of the economy, we use the rule of thumb and produce region-specific
GCC productivity shocks for the whole primary agriculture based on the weighted average
IMPACT crop projections.
Table 4.4: Senegal, GCC: scenarios (total % change over 2015-50).
Scenario
Agricultural productivity Prices (world)
Dakar Thi Dio Center North South crops oagr
No GCC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.66 11.29
GFDL -15.01 -15.01 -11.59 -4.56 -4.84 28.31 11.94
IPSI -23.60 -23.60 -28.37 -14.41 -17.32 30.03 12.42
HADGEM -31.15 -31.15 -34.64 -15.81 -10.71 31.28 12.39
Note: No GCC = no-global-climate-change scenario; GFDL = Geophysical Fluid Dynam-
ics Laboratory Climate Model; IPSL = Institut Pierre Simon Laplace Earth System Model;
HADGEM = Hadley Centre Global Environment Model.
Source: Calculations based on the IMPACT model.
Then we use GCC scenarios (Table 4.4) and supply them into the IFPRI-type CGE model
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of the Senegalese economy (Table 4.5)4. Similar to Wiebelt et al. (2013), Wiebelt et al. (2015),
Arndt et al. (2015), and Siddig et al. (2020), and other authors who measure economywide
repercussions of agricultural GCC shocks, we model GCC scenarios through the factor produc-
tivity parameters in the value-added production functions and model parameters that define
the world market prices in the trade block of model equations. At the same time, our study is
distinct from the literature strands because we focus on the country’s fundamental economic
transformation resulting from GCC. We assume that deagrarianization will be the primary
GCC adaptation strategy of rural households and suppose that sectoral and regional income
differentials resulting from the agricultural productivity decline will shape the country’s eco-
nomic transformation.
Table 4.5: Senegal, GCC: specification of CGE model.
Block Category Functional form / closure (endogenous variables)
Production (regions)
Value-added
CES. Elasticities: crops=0.24; oagr=0.24; mini=0.2; agpr= 1.12;
oind=1.26; serv and padm=1.68. Source: Aguiar et al. (2016).
Intermediates Leontief
Top of technology Leontief







The exchange rate is the model numeraire; Consumer Price Index
and domestic producers’ price level are flexible;
Rest of the World the current account balance and world market prices are exogenous;
Government Fixed government tax rates; (dis)savings adjust to net revenues;
Savings/Investment Neoclassical: fixed savings rate, endogenous investment
Factors
Capital: ‘putty-clay’: newly generated capital is mobile and its
distribution depends on the rents (↑ rents ⇒ ↑ new capital, see Diao
and Thurlow (2012) for more details); Labor and land: fully
employed and mobile (within regions); interregional labor
transformation via CET (below)
Note: GAMS model code and other data available from the authors upon request.
The shock transmission channel is modeled as follows. First, we assume that GCC produc-
tivity decline in agriculture will affect capital and land production factors only. This assumption
4. The model is based on the standard recursive-dynamic CGE model of the IFPRI, which we tailor to
reflect country-specific adjustment mechanisms. A detailed description of the IFPRI-type CGE model and its
equations can be found in Löfgren et al. (2002) and Diao and Thurlow (2012) and in Chapter 1 (equations of
the Egypt model).
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is justified because, unlike specific land and capital production factors, the most significant agri-
cultural labor is noneducated (see Table 4.6), meaning that it is relatively homogeneous, and
its productivity losses due to intersectoral or interregional mobility are relatively low.
Table 4.6: Senegal, GCC: contribution of agricultural factors to GDP, %, 2015.
FLND FCAP-c FCAP-l FLAB-n LAB-p FLAB-s FLAB-t
Total
agriculture
Dakar 0.36 0.34 0.14 0.28 0.04 0.01 0.00 1.17
Thi Dio 2.81 3.97 1.08 2.22 0.38 0.12 0.01 10.59
Center 18.21 10.93 11.75 16.04 1.35 0.66 0.00 58.95
North 8.54 10.84 9.43 8.98 1.37 0.44 0.02 39.61
South 12.79 10.74 8.30 10.57 1.12 0.45 0.01 43.99
National 4.25 3.85 2.97 3.77 0.44 0.17 0.01 15.45
Note: FLND = agricultural land; FCAP-c=crops capital; FCAP-l=livestock capital; FLAB-
n=non-educated labor; FLAB-p=primary educated labor; FLAB-s=secondary educated labor;
FLAB-t=tertiary educated labor.
Source: Calculations based on Randriamamonjy and Thurlow (2019).
Then, agricultural assets’ reduced productivity implies that agriculture receives less invest-
ment than other sectors (see ’putty clay’ closure in Table 4.5). Given its rigid production
function (very low CES elasticities, see Table 4.5), labor cannot substitute scarcer land and
capital. Therefore, having less demand, agricultural labor is devalued and pushed out of agri-
cultural activities. As other sectors with higher wages can employ released agricultural labor
force, this shock transmission channel allows us to model the economic transformation.
The absorbents of deagrarianized labor can be either nonagricultural activities within the
region or, conditional on the interregional mobility, activities in other regions with higher wages.
We assume that the labor can be reallocated across the activities within their regions without
any frictions (full employment and mobility assumption for region-specific labor factor, see
Table 4.5). To model the interregional mobility of labor, we use a relatively straightforward
approach and apply (volume-preserving) the CET function (see Dixon and Rimmer 2003, 2006;
Mensbrugghe and Peters 2016). Under this approach, regions with higher wages attract more
labor, and household costs associated with reallocating labor from one region to another are
represented through exogenously specified elasticity parameters (the higher the elasticity, the
higher is the mobility to regions with higher wages)5. Furthermore, as our model separates
5. It should be mentioned that upon the data availability, the interregional mobility of labor can be modeled
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households and factors, we assume that households stay in their provinces, but they can receive
factor income earned in the other regions. This mechanism can be interpreted as remittances
sent to the family by internal labor migrants, and it allows us to take into account positive
welfare effects for migrant-sending regions.
4.3 Scenarios of Senegals’ economic transformation
Our simulation results demonstrate that GCC’s overall economic impact is expected to be rel-
atively low, with GDP losses reaching 2.08% under the worst-case HADGEM scenario (Table
4.7). At the same time, these losses are unevenly distributed across sectors and regions of
the country. On a sectoral level, due to direct productivity losses, agriculture is expected to
experience the worst economic decline. In turn, although not directly hit, downstream agro-
processing also shrinks because its most essential intermediates - agricultural commodities -
get more expensive due to domestic and world market price increase. With increasing GCC
severity, the whole agribusiness sector becomes less effective and loses in the competition for
production factors to other economic sectors. Under the assumption of interregional immobil-
ity of labor, the industrial sector is expected to be the primary beneficiary of the country’s
GCC-induced deagrarianization (Table 4.7). Compared to income-dependent services, the less
elastic industrial sector additionally benefits from the depreciated real exchange rate6 and pulls
production factors to itself. Consequently, besides GCC shocks, the regional losses largely
depend on their economic structure. The most severe GDP losses are expected in the rural
region Center, whose underdeveloped industrial sector cannot absorb the deagrarianized labor
force and cushion GCC shocks. At the same time, Dakar and neighboring Thiès & Diourbel
are the most industrialized and the least agrarian regions in the country, and despite having
comparable shocks as Center (see Table 4.4), they are expected to be the most resilient to GCC.
However, the economic loss distribution is not fully mirrored in the households’ welfare
(Table 4.8). Like other case-country studies (e. g. Breisinger et al. 2013; Wiebelt et al. 2015),
we find that farmers (households who own agricultural land) are not the main cost-bearers of
GCC. Although all households suffer from increased agricultural prices (both domestic and
based on the econometric estimates of migration gravity equations, where besides wage/income differentials,
the attractiveness of the region depends on distance, demography, and other non-monetary factors (see Borgy
et al. (2010) and Luo et al. (2016) for details).
6. Real exchange rate in % vs No GCC by 2050 (no interregional mobility): GFDL-0.7; IPSL -1.56; HADGEM
- 1.8.
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Table 4.7: Senegal, GCC: GDP losses (% vs No GCC by 2050, no interregional mobility).
Scenario Total
by sectors by regions
crops oagr mini agpr oind serv Dakar Thi Dio Center North South
GFDL -0.74 -8.03 -3.89 2.62 -4.77 1.33 -0.40 -0.22 -0.90 -3.69 -0.89 -1.13
IPSI -1.86 -20.80 -9.62 5.59 -9.35 2.47 -0.89 -0.56 -1.52 -9.37 -2.75 -3.98
HADGEM -2.08 -22.88 -10.90 6.29 -10.61 2.75 -0.99 -0.67 -2.01 -11.77 -2.99 -2.13
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
import), and reduce real consumption, farmers are expected to be less affected than urban and
rural non-farm households. Despite reduced productivity, we expect factor remuneration of
agricultural land to increase, especially in regions with a relatively mild productivity decrease
(North and South). Land becomes a scarce and expensive production factor that cannot be
easily substituted (very low CES elasticities, see Table 4.5). Therefore, landowners (farmers),
unlike urban and landless rural households, can partly compensate for their consumption losses.
However, because significant income disparities already characterize the country, residents of
industrialized regions (Dakar, Thiès & Diourbel) are projected to be still much wealthier than
their rural provincial compatriots.
Table 4.8: Senegal, GCC: households’ losses (by 2050, no interregional mobility).




GFDL -1.78 -2.30 0.29 -3.65 -1.94 -2.66 -1.89 -0.70 -0.15
IPSI -4.01 -4.22 -2.74 -7.31 -3.34 -4.90 -7.74 -3.38 -3.14
HADGEM -4.53 -4.77 -3.13 -7.99 -3.78 -5.78 -10.08 -3.79 -1.45
% below poverty
line
No GCC 36.14 23.80 53.72 22.66 11.82 27.49 38.83 45.49 64.85
GFDL 37.64 25.66 54.11 26.29 12.14 31.07 41.74 45.86 65.62
IPSI 40.67 27.81 57.59 30.66 12.14 34.98 48.13 49.23 68.95
HADGEM 40.85 28.31 57.41 30.90 12.14 36.32 49.90 49.59 66.80
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
GCC’s uneven impact on the regional economies and persisting regional income disparities
can facilitate interregional labor mobility. We expect that poorer less educated households
of rural provinces will offer their labor in the regions with higher wages. To model these
processes, we assume that each labor type’s supply across the regions is distributed via the
CET function with the elasticity values of 0.5 and 2. Given data absence, we assume that these
arbitrarily chosen elasticity parameters represent scenarios of rigid and flexible responses to
wage differentials across the regions (rigid=0.5; flexible=2). Due to this paper’s size restrictions,
we present the interregional labor mobility scenarios only for the most severe ’HADGEM’ GCC
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scenario.
According to our simulations, interregional labor mobility allows smoothing the GCC’s
overall negative economic impact (Table 4.9). This effect, however, is associated with growing
economic imbalances across the country. With its highest wages, Dakar is expected to be the
most significant labor-pulling region, and compared to the interregional labor immobility, the
inflow of cheap labor boosts its economy. In contrast, the provincial economies become even
more non-competitive and plummet. As a result, we expect Dakar to gain economic weight at
the expense of other provinces and be the only region with positive growth rates.
Table 4.9: Senegal, GCC: regional GDP under interregional labor mobility (HADGEM, % vs
No GCC by 2050).
Region
GDP changes GDP shares
no rigid flexible no rigid flexible
National -2.08 -1.75 -1.69 100.00 100.00 100.00
Dakar -0.67 1.11 1.55 59.08 59.94 60.16
Thi Dio -2.01 -1.37 -1.30 17.38 17.43 17.44
Center -11.77 -16.85 -18.05 6.92 6.50 6.41
North -2.99 -5.09 -5.66 9.31 9.07 9.01
South -2.13 -5.23 -6.15 7.31 7.05 6.98
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
Redistribution analysis on a sectoral level (Table 4.10) reveals further important details.
Provincial industrial and service sectors that could have benefited from the local deagrari-
anization, with increasing interregional labor mobility, are losing competitiveness to Dakar,
where services and industrial sectors are expected to be the most important destinations for
the former agricultural labor force. With increasing ’Dakarization’, the pace of the country’s
deagrarianization can be almost doubled. Under the HADGEM GCC scenario with no interre-
gional mobility, only 9.8% (152.95 thousand, see Figure 4.1) of the noneducated labor force is
leaving agricultural activities; however, with increasing interregional mobility, Dakarian indus-
try and services absorb the former agricultural labor force at a larger scale, and agriculture is
losing 18% (275.85 thousand, see Figure 4.1) of its most crucial labor factor.
’Dakarization’ of the country is also expected to smooth spatial income disparities (Table
4.11). In particular, poor rural households can improve their well-being by offering their labor
factors in rich Dakar and repatriating profits back home. Rural regions can also benefit because
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Table 4.10: Senegal, GCC: sectoral GDP under interregional labor mobility (HADGEM, % vs
No GCC by 2050.
Sector no rigid flexible Sector no rigid flexible
Agriculture -15.87 -16.95 -17.32 Other industry 3.38 4.21 4.41
Dakar -23.86 -21.96 -21.19 Dakar 3.63 5.24 5.65
Thi Dio -23.48 -22.23 -21.78 Thi Dio 3.31 4.10 4.26
Center -27.12 -29.93 -30.90 Center 2.06 -1.02 -1.77
North -7.62 -8.08 -8.26 North 3.21 2.07 1.74
South -3.93 -4.90 -5.25 South 1.65 -0.49 -1.20
Agroprocessing -10.61 -11.82 -12.22 Services -0.91 -0.34 -0.21
Dakar -9.60 -10.25 -10.54 Dakar -1.33 0.78 1.30
Thi Dio -9.70 -10.28 -10.50 Thi Dio -1.35 -0.74 -0.74
Center -13.19 -16.90 -17.75 Center 4.28 -4.99 -6.75
North -13.04 -15.48 -16.12 North 0.64 -3.84 -4.98
South -14.00 -17.18 -18.09 South -0.35 -5.38 -6.82
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.















Agriculture Agroprocessing Other industry Services
rigidno
Notes:
• using nationwide estimates of labor
force by the ILO 2020 (non-educated
labor in 2015: 2,171.20 thousand);
• assuming 2.37% of p.a. growth rate
(based on population growth projec-
tions by the UN 2019 and assuming
proportional growth of labor factors).
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
4.3. SCENARIOS OF SENEGAL’S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 59
the outflow of the labor to Dakar eases the pressure on local wages (e. g., almost a quarter of
labor factor income of the region ’Center’ is expected to be earned in Dakar). However, the
massive inflow of labor from the provinces to Dakar can suppress the Dakarian wages and, thus,
negatively affect the income growth of Dakarian households. Nevertheless, even in this case,
Dakar will be the richest in the country, with significantly lower poverty rates than in other
regions.
Table 4.11: Senegal, GCC: households’ welfare under interregional labor mobility (HADGEM
by 2050).
Real per capita cons
(% diff. vs. No GCC)




no rigid flexible no rigid flexible rigid flexible
Dakar -3.78 -5.23 -5.62 12.14 12.54 12.54 0 0
Thi Dio -5.78 -5.66 -5.56 36.32 35.65 35.65 0.00 0.22
Center -10.08 -4.26 -3.21 49.90 40.83 39.05 19.68 22.01
North -3.79 -0.95 -0.24 49.59 44.90 44.44 8.06 9.91
South -1.45 2.26 3.20 66.80 63.42 62.61 12.43 15.11
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
Although urbanization and ‘Dakarization’ of the country resulting from non-interventional
policy smooth the overall negative impact of GCC and decrease spatial income disparities,
adjacent studies suggest that further consideration of policy interventions is necessary. In
particular, the most recent growth-focused literature strands argue that uncontrolled labor
movement in sSA can have long-term growth repercussions that cannot be directly accounted
for in our model. For instance, McMillan et al. (2014) find that, unlike in Asian countries,
structural change in sSA from 1990 to 2000 was growth-reducing, with labor moving towards
mostly informal urban services. The authors find evidence of a potential turnaround after 2000
and express cautious optimism about African growth prospects through industry-led structural
change. Similarly, Rodrik (2016) emphasizes that unproductive and informal urban services
are major destinations for rural-urban migrants in sSA. He analyzes various growth options,
and in the context of poor industrialization pace, expects mediocre long-term growth rates in
sSA of a maximum of 2% per capita p.a.
Given this context, the expected deagrarianization of Senegal towards the services can be
concerning. Being the largest sector in the country (almost 58% of the country’s GDP in 2015,
see Table 4.2), the services sector can absorb more agricultural labor than the industry (in
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absolute numbers, see Figure 4.1). More important, however, is that the lion’s share of mostly
uneducated agricultural labor is likely to join trade and transport services that are notoriously
known for their informality (depending on interregional flexibility, the share of the labor force
absorbed by these subsectors varies from 73 to 83% of the total labor force absorbed by services).
Given this context, we also conduct a brief analysis of the potential policy interventions that
can reduce services’ partaking in the country’s deagrarianization.
As a set of potential policy interventions, we consider TFP growth of the nonagricultural
sectors (aggregate nonagricultural industry and aggregate services on the regional level). We
assume that considered sectors are technologically homogenous and have equal costs of TFP
increase (for the same money, sectors of the same size should receive an equal TFP boost).
This is a rather strong assumption, but at least on an aggregated level it allows us to conduct
coarse comparisons of policy interventions. To set values of TFP policy parameters, we assume
that an additional 1% of TFP growth of the whole economy is achieved only by considered
sector and treat obtained results as comparable sectoral policy elasticities. As a set of policy
outcomes, we focus on noneducated labor employment and the overall impact on real per-capita
consumption for all households.
Table 4.12: Senegal, GCC: TFP sectoral elasticities (% vs. HADGEM flexible by 2050).
TFP boost of the industrial sector in
Dakar Thi Dio Center South North
Non-educated labor, total industry (non ag) -1.96 -2.04 -1.77 -2.01 -2.01
Non-educated labor, total services 1.12 1.06 0.61 0.66 0.74
Real per-capita consumption (total households) 2.08 2.11 1.06 0.92 1.36
TFP boost of the services sector in
Dakar Thi Dio Center South North
Non-educated labor, total industry (non ag) 1.17 1.09 1.38 1.05 1.36
Non-educated labor, total services -0.74 -0.77 -0.92 -0.70 -0.90
Real per-capita consumption (total households) 1.40 1.14 1.10 1.10 1.10
Note: p.a. TFP growth rates:
Industry (non agr.): Dakar=0.29; Thi Dio= 0.86; Center=3.34; North= 2.20; South=3.34;
Services: Dakar=0.08; Thi Dio= 0.29; Center=1.01; North= 1.02; South=0.83;
Source: Calculations based on Senegal CGE model.
Our simulation results (Table 4.12) demonstrate that increasing productivity of a sector
leads to own factor demand reduction and diverts noneducated labor to competing sectors (in-
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creased productivity of industrial sectors will push noneducated labor towards services and vice
versa). In terms of immediately observable income growth, investing in raising the productiv-
ity of Dakar’s industrial sectors seems to deliver the highest policy return. At the same time,
this policy is also associated with the highest increase of undesirable services’ absorption of
noneducated labor.
All in all, these findings align with the recently emerged concept of ‘premature deindustri-
alization’. Rodrik (2015) investigates transformation patterns of modern developing economies
and shows that increasing industrial productivity leads to low-skill employment reduction,
which is part of the broader growth-reducing phenomenon of ‘premature deindustrialization’.
According to Rodrik (2015), low-income countries like Senegal should avoid premature dein-
dustrialization because industrialization, especially through organized, formal manufacturing,
is associated with the economy-wide productivity spillovers, making it the most potent engine
of long-term growth. In this context, although our CGE model is not growth-focused7, our
outcome variables still serve as proxies to reflect an unavoidable trade-off between short and
long-term growth prospects faced by the policymakers in the context of forthcoming labor dea-
grarization. From one side, the immediately observable multiplicative effect of boosting the
productivity of industrial sectors appears to be higher than that of services. At the same time,
as former agricultural labor then is pushed out of industry towards services, this policy con-
tributes to the deindustrialization of Senegal, which, according to Rodrik (2015), will reduce the
country’s potent for future economic growth. On the other side, boosting the productivity of
services, although less effective immediately, pushes uneducated labor towards industry, thus,
paving the way for rapid future growth through industrialization.
Nevertheless, it must also be noted that our findings on policy interventions should be
treated cautiously because of the coarse and ad-hoc nature of our simulations and corresponding
assumptions. A more nuanced analysis of policy interventions (such as detailization on a sub-
sectoral level) and consideration of other important factors (such as trade or budgeting8) might
be necessary in future elaborations and extensions.
7. Our model has endogenized capital accumption, but other growth determinants such TFP growth are
given exogenously (Hicks neutral rate of technical change, see Löfgren et al. 2002; Diao and Thurlow 2012).
8. For instance, in the recent work, Diao and McMillan (2018) adjust the Lewis Model to explain sSA’s
growth patterns. They find that structural transformation, besides agricultural and nonagricultural produc-
tivity, depends on the terms of trade and sources of public investment to enhance productivity growth. The
authors show that when TFP growth is financed through foreign inflows, it can cause significant real exchange




In this paper, we investigate the potential role of GCC in the structural transformation processes
in sSA. We use Senegal as a case study country and analyze how various GCC scenarios might
affect its economy, household welfare, and labor reallocation across sectors and regions.
Our simulation results suggest that GCC’s overall impact is expected to be moderate, with
overall GDP losses reaching 2.08% under the worst-case scenario. At the same time, the losses
are unevenly distributed across sectors and regions, and GCC can significantly impact coun-
try’s economic structure and increase existing regional imbalances. As directly hit agriculture
becomes less efficient and non-competitive, uneducated labor that constitutes the lion’s share of
the agricultural labor force will deagrarianize and join other economic activities. The most de-
veloped and the least rural Dakar region is the most resilient to GCC shocks, and its economy
is expected to outcompete provincial nonagricultural sectors and attract former agricultural
labor from all provinces. The pulling power of the large Dakarian economy, with increasing
interregional mobility, can double the pace of country’s deagrarianization and contribute to
internal migration.
Although expected urbanization and ‘Dakarization’ of the country allow alleviating nega-
tive consequences of GCC, nonintervention policy is also associated with potentially negative
repercussions. In particular, the urban services’ absorption of mostly uneducated agricultural
labor can slow industrialization and hamper the country’s long-term growth prospects. One
of the policy options that can push the former agricultural labor force from the services to
industry can be a productivity boost that reduces services demand for unskilled labor. This
option, however, appears to be not an optimal policy in terms of immediate policy returns, as
boosting the productivity of Dakar’s industrial sectors is likely to outperform similar policies
in any service sector across the country.
Our approach and findings thus contribute to defining the best policies in the context of
forthcoming GCC and labor deagrarization in sSA. Besides the more refined approach to the
potential policy instruments themselves, future work in this direction might also require taking
into account the multidimensional nature of the national goals, which besides standard growth
and poverty reduction targets, can distinctly highlight such aspects as regional development,
inclusive provincial growth, or internal migration reduction.
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